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MAcMap-HS6v2 is a comprehensive database providing detailed protection data at the 6 digit level of the 
harmonized system (HS6), i.e. more than 5000 products, for the year 2004.  It includes ad valorem 
equivalents on MFN tariffs for 169 importing countries, as well as bilateral applied protection, together 
with preferential provisions for 220 partners. Specific and compound tariffs and tariff rate quotasdata are 
also provided, at the same level of detail.  
In this paper we present the methodology used for building this new database, paying attention to the 
consequences from such choices. We then provide evidence on the world applied protection in 2004. 
Finally we investigate variations in tariffs occurred between 2001 and 2004. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Trade negotiations increasingly rely on quantitative assessments. Accordingly there is a need for detailed 
tariff information shedding light on applied protection across the world. The purpose of the present study 
is not only to provide a way to measure border protection, but also to pave the way for well-suited 
economic analysis of the consequences of trade liberalization, in particular through computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models.  
In a joint effort of the International Trade Center (ITC) (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development/World Trade Organization, Geneva) and CEPII (Paris), a first version of the Market Access 
Maps database (MAcMap-HS6v1) was prepared in 2003 Bouët et al. 2008),
1
Using 2004 data and following a similar approach, an updated version of this database, MAcMap-
HS6v2, has been built. This paper describes in detail the methodology used to build the new database; it 
also provides evidence on applied protection around the world in 2004. Moreover, since this data set is 
the source of protection data for the GTAP7 database (Narayanan and Walmsley 2008) and the TASTE 
software (Horridge and Laborde 2008), this documentation is an important reference for numerous 
researchers. This effort is a complement of the development of the online version of MAcMap. ITC is 
providing a regularly updated picture of the world-wide protection mainly devoted to export promotion 
agencies or trade negotiators. A by-product of this joint effort of ITC, the WTO and UNCTAD is the 
publication of the “World Trade Profiles” annually. 
 mainly to furnish protection 
figures for the sixth release of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database (Bouët et al. 2005). 
The first version of MAcMap-HS6 represented an unprecedented effort to monitor border protection 
worldwide at the most detailed level, while accounting exhaustively for preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs). It provided a consistent, ad valorem equivalent (AVE) measure of tariff duties and tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs) for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS), 
accounting for 5,113 products. Its main contributions were (i) an exhaustive coverage of PTAs across the 
world; (ii) the calculation of the AVE of specific duties, acknowledging the differentiated impact of such 
duties across exporters depending on their export unit values; (iii) the incorporation of TRQs both through 
the AVE of the resulting protection at the margin and through the calculation of involved rents; and (iv) 
an original aggregation methodology using a weighting scheme based on reference groups of countries 
and limiting the extent of the endogeneity bias inherent in the standard, import-weighted average 
protection.  
We present the methodology used to construct MAcMap-HS6v2, a database devoted to analytical 
research, in section 2. Although this methodology is similar to that used previously, several key 
improvements have been made. Additional sources have been added to the core ITC data set to complete 
that data set and enhance the quality of the database. A new algorithm is used to deal with harmonized 
product nomenclature and code oddities. The method applied to process TRQ information has been vastly 
improved. Finally, the way reference group weights are computed has been fine-tuned. 
Section 3 presents a general overview of tariff protection across the world in 2004. The relatively 
low protection rate, 5.1 percent on average for the whole world, hides a high level of heterogeneity among 
countries and sectors. The average level of protection decreases with the level of development: in 2004, 
high-income countries (HICs) have an average duty of 3.3 percent, against 9.6 percent for middle-income 
countries (MICs) and 12.2 percent for least-developed countries (LDCs). Agriculture as a sector is more 
protected (18.9 percent) than either manufacturing (4.4 percent) or extractive and energy products (1.9 
percent), reflecting the fact that agriculture plays a specific role for almost all countries. Last but not least, 
final goods are more protected than intermediate goods, a practice that aims to increase the effective 
protection of the locally produced value-added. In the same section, we investigate variations in tariffs 
occurring between 2001 and 2004. The 0.5 percentage point drop in the average world protection between 
                                                       
1 MAcMap-HS6v1 was first presented in Bouët et al. (2004); the MAcMap approach was introduced in Bouët et al. (2002).  
2 
2001 and 2004 is mainly due to MICs. For one thing, MICs achieved their Uruguay Round commitments 
in 2004, against 2001 for rich countries; and a number of emerging economies adopted more liberal trade 
policies (i.e., China and India). The total variation in protection between the two time periods has been 
decomposed into several effects: changes in the TRQ regime, the system of weights, the unit values, and 
exchange rates and residual changes from pure trade policies.  
The increase in average agricultural protection in rich countries (+6 percent in relative terms) 
contrasts with the global decrease. It does not seem to come from a modification of trade policies; rather 
it is the result of two effects. One is the mechanical effect of the fall of the U.S. dollar on the European 
Union AVE, due to the conversion into U.S. dollars of the specific tariff (initially expressed in local 
currency per physical unit). Second, several tariff rate quotas previously unfilled (in quota) have been 
filled or even exceeded. The immediate consequence is thus an increase in the protection exporters face. 
Section 4 concludes. Two appendices provide additional information on methodology and 
protection figures by country.   
3 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we describe the data and the methodology used to build MAcMap-HS6v2. We also 
underscore the differences between the current version and the previous version (Bouët et al. 2008).  
As data on applied protection are scattered and heterogeneous, the first step when tackling 
protection measurement is to collect and harmonize available information. Even at this early stage a 
number of choices must be made, since there is no unique or obvious way to handle the data. Once that 
has been done, the construction of the database mainly involves computing AVEs and proposing an 
appropriate aggregation procedure. 
Figure 1.  Processing steps of MAcMap-HS6v2 
 
The first difference between the two versions of the MAcMap-HS6 database is the increased 
number of data sources considered: ITC’s MAcMap data set is used as a primary source, but for several 
countries we rely directly on national sources to avoid any loss of information (see table 1). In addition, 
the bound tariff database (Bchir, Jean, and Laborde 2006) has been updated. The second difference 
concerns the technical side, where some improvements have been introduced. More efficient algorithms 
have been used to deal with data oddities. A special treatment is applied to tariff rate quotas. Finally, 
different concepts of unit value have been defined to answer alternative researchers’ needs. Figure 1 
shows the different steps of the procedure, which are further described in the following paragraphs. It is 
worth stressing that MAcMap on line (and consequently the world Tariff Profiles) are using different 
methods to compute AVEs, taking benefit of the availability of tariff line information for a large series of 
countries. The data collected by ITC, the UNCTAD and the WTO and provided by ITC through MAcMap 
is an unprecedented effort to release consistent tariff data on an exhaustive and detailed basis. Still, such 
huge database necessarily contains some problems at a given point in time, that would indeed be fixed in 
a further release but that need to be fixed all in a raw in a database such as MAcMap-HS6 devoted to 
academic exercises.  
4 
Data 
MAcMap-HS6v2 is a large data set, providing duties for 171 importers and 209 exporters over 5,113 
products for the year 2004. It is developed using the SAS® software.  
ITC Database 
The main data source2
Complements to the Core Data 
 is an extraction of ITC’s MAcMap (www.MAcMap.org) database, which contains 
exhaustive information at the tariff line level. The ITC database includes the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD’s) TRade Analysis and INformation System (TRAINS) 
database, to which ITC experts add their own data. The input file for MAcMap-HS6v2 contains applied 
tariffs at the bilateral level at the HS6 level, with an ad valorem component and two specific components 
(each associated to a given physical unit). 
Although the ITC database constitutes an essential input to our work, we find it necessary to improve this 
primary source of data to fix a number of problems, such as the following (see Figure 2): 
1.  Information can be outdated for some countries even if the data are labeled “2004.” While 
this is not an issue for a database regularly updated like MAcMap on line, this is 
much more a concern for a data base aiming at being fundamentally unchanged such 
as MAcMap-HS6. First, countries that have instituted important recent reforms (such as 
India or Egypt in 2004) may still be represented with outdated information. In addition, new 
free trade agreements (FTAs) may be imperfectly translated (e.g., the U.S.-Chile FTA): if 
country A and country B have signed an FTA and only country A has been updated, that 
creates asymmetric preferences in the database instead of the reciprocal preference scheme.  
2.  The ITC data may be incomplete in some specific cases for several reasons. First, some 
products are missing as a result of incomplete tariff schedule notifications. Second, due to 
complex tariff legislation, the relevant information, displayed as a footnote in the country 
tariff schedule, may have been discarded in an initial automatic treatment. Third, a tariff 
applied on a specific tariff line can be based on information related to other tariff lines: for 
example, the tariff for a fruit juice (generic tariff line) may refer explicitly to the tariff applied 
on the fresh fruit (specific tariff line), or the tariff applied on a set of goods (cloth suits, 
toolboxes) may represent the sum of the tariffs applied on the components. To compute a 
tariff for all these lines, instead of using a 0 as was done in the initial data set, we implement 
specific treatments (e.g., assumption on the average composition of a bundled good; cross-
tariff lines procedure to retrieve the information). Information on entry prices and seasonal 
tariffs may be missing, as well. In MAcMap-HS6, the latter two problems are only partially 
covered. Only the EU case, based on the integrated tariff of the European Communities 
(TARIC) information, has benefited from a specific treatment: first, the yearly average3 of 
monthly tariffs is used to take into account intra-year variation; and second, the entry-price 
tariff is selected based on the unit values used in the database4
3.  A few countries are missing in this extraction (e.g., Tonga and Mongolia, two World Trade 
Organization [WTO] members). 
 for the sake of consistency. 
                                                       
2 We are grateful to Mondher Mimouni and Xavier Pichot for their collaboration and their kind support by providing the 
primary dataset. 
3 It may be argued that taking the highest tariff over the year will be a better measurement of the protectionist barrier 
implemented. However, since there is no ideal solution, we rely on the simple average over the year. 
4 This procedure is implemented starting with the MAcMap-HS6v2.2 release.  
5 
4.  When countries use two tariff lines for managing in- and out-of-quota rates (e.g., the United 
States, Canada, Japan), these tariff lines are treated as two different products (instead of one) 
biasing downward the six-digit-level tariff provided by ITC. 
5.  In a few cases, confusion exists between excise taxes (domestic taxation) and tariff duties 
(e.g., Australia and New Zealand on alcoholic beverages). To detect and correct such cases, 
we detect all non-zero bilateral tariffs for which an effective FTA or custom union (CU) is 
implemented and manually investigate the different cases. This may show that the remaining 
tax is not a tariff (as in the case of Australia).
5
Figure 2.  Adjustments made on the ITC data set 
   
 
Thus, we completely replace the data for some countries (the United States, the European Union, 
India, Egypt see Table 1 for sources), partially replace the data for others (especially for all members of 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa [COMESA], the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations [ASEAN], and the Southern African Customs Union [SACU]), and add the data for missing 
WTO countries. For all countries, we build an exhaustive data set that includes all preferential regimes, 
relying mainly on national administrative documents (official tariff schedules). The remaining problems 
are corrected by using targeted procedures as described previously. 
                                                       
5 It is important to note that an "additional duty" has been included in the database even if it is not legally speaking a tariff: 
for example, the ethanol (HS6 220690) tax applied by the United States on ethanol imports.  
6 
Table 1.  Source of data for countries with complete replacement of data 
Country  Source 
United States  Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2004). USITC 
publication 3653 and http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/other/dataweb/ 
European Union  TARIC database (specific extraction) 
India  http://commerce.nic.in/ and http://www.cbec.gov.in/customs/cst-
0607/cst-main.htm 
Egypt  Egyptian Tariff Schedule and collaboration with Peter Minor from 
Nathan Associates 
Mongolia, Tonga  WTO notifications and tariff schedule (www.wto.org) 
Nomenclature  
MAcMap-HS6 uses the HS6 nomenclature, which is the most detailed level of the international 
nomenclature for goods defined by the World Customs Organization (WCO). Several versions of this 
nomenclature exist, based on year (the most recent one is 2007).  
For our purposes, we convert all codes from ITC into revision 1 (1996) to harmonize them using 
WCO official mapping tables following the procedure displayed in Figure 3. Raw data from ITC can 
belong to different versions of the HS6 nomenclature—0 (1988), 1 (1996), and 2 (2002)—whereas 
countries for which we use other data sources have adopted a more recent revision (2002). Besides, it 
happens that some countries mix different revisions at the same time. This is a real problem because one 
code can correspond to different products depending on the revision. Moreover, some codes in the 
original data set do not exist in any nomenclature or have been truncated. 
To avoid wasting information due to qualitative errors, we have developed an algorithm for 
dealing with aberrant codes. First, for each country we identify the “primary” nomenclature version. It is 
the revision (0, 1, or 2) for which the codes that exist in only one revision are the most represented. The 
same methodology is used to define the “secondary” nomenclature. We follow this hierarchy to convert 
each code into revision 1, each code being converted only one time. To illustrate this strategy, let’s take 
two examples. First, let’s assume that a code exists in both revision 1 and 2 but the revision 2 code covers 
a wider selection of products, meaning several revision 1 codes (for example, the revision 2 code 071190 
vegetables and mixture of vegetables, which corresponds to 071110 and 071190 in the revision 1). If we 
assume that the primary nomenclature is revision 1, and since this code exists in revision 1, we do not 
need to proceed to a conversion. On the other hand, if we assume that the primary nomenclature is 
revision 2, we have to proceed to a conversion and use this tariff information for other lines. Second, the 
same code exists in revisions 0 and 2 but it does not map to the same HS6 revision 1 code depending on 
its origin. Once again, knowing the nomenclature of origin of the code is important since we can use the 
relevant correspondence table (from revision 0 to 1 or from revision 2 to 1). 
This strategy enables us to deal with the conversion of codes that exist, but in some cases we have 
to go further. When an erroneous code—a code that does not exist in any official WCO nomenclature—is 
detected, the algorithm uses a sequential procedure to look for a similar code with missing information to 
fill the gap. First, codes that include non-numerical characters are extracted in order to pre-treat them 
manually.
6
In addition, at a final stage, simple averages at the five- or four-digit HS level are used to provide 
tariffs for missing HS6 products. 
 Then, the algorithm looks for close HS6 products that belongs to the same HS5 position and 
that have no information in the tariff schedule and replaces missing information by the tariff associated to 
the erroneous code.   
It is noteworthy to check that methodologies used in both previous paragraphs deliver the same 
results for a frequent case when countries use a 0 (or 00) in the last position of the HS6 code to indicate 
                                                       
6 This stage requires manual treatment since non-numerical characters can be related to aberrant information or a specific 
codification in some national tariff schedule nomenclature.  
7 
that this tariff rate will apply to any products belonging to this position—that is, that the 0 can be replaced 
by any number for any HS6 code not elsewhere defined.  Geographical nomenclature corresponds to the 
ISO codification of the United Nations.
7
Figure 3.  Nomenclature adjustments 
 Uninhabited territories (e.g., Bouvet Islands) and countries with a 
gross domestic product (GDP) of less than US$50 million (e.g., Montserrat) have been excluded from the 
data set. The EU25 is processed as a single entity but is disaggregated in a final stage. 
 
                                                       
7 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm. A few changes have been made: 842 instead of 840 for the United 
States, 490 for Taiwan, 579 instead of 578 for Norway, 699 instead of 356 for India, and 757 instead of 756 for Switzerland. 
Finally, the code for the EU25 entity is 918.  
8 
Trade Data 
Trade data come from the BACI database (Base pour l’Analyse du Commerce International), developed 
at CEPII based on United Nation’s COMTRADE database and fully documented in Gaulier, Paillacar, 
and Zignago (2008). It is a harmonized dataset using the COMTRADE data set as raw data, providing 
time series of bilateral trade at the HS6 level worldwide. A specific extraction is realized for MAcMap-
HS6v2 to make trade data compatible with the revision 1 HS nomenclature, to get individual data for 
SACU members, and to split Benelux into two countries (Belgium and Luxembourg).  
MAcMap-HS6v2 makes use of a simple average of three consecutive years (2002, 2003, and 
2004) both for values and volumes, in order to reduce the volatility in trade data. In addition, the BACI 
data set generates a matrix (products by quantity units) that provides coefficients to convert Comtrade 
standard physical units
8
Computing an Ad Valorem Equivalent at the Six-Digit Level 
 into tons for each HS6 product. The quantity data, totally expressed in tons, is 
used in our data set to compute both unit values and weighting schemes. 
The lack of harmonized trade data at the tariff line level needed to compute unit values or weights for 
aggregation leads us to build a database at the six-digit level in order to supply international researchers 
with a uniform product nomenclature. 
To provide an AVE at the six-digit level from the tariff line data set,
9
1.  Obtain at the six-digit level a simplified compound tariff with a single specific tariff 
expressed in dollars by ton that sums up with a single ad valorem component;
 two main operations have to 
be performed: 
10
2.  Define a unit value that will be used to convert the specific component previously defined 
into an AVE. 
 and 
We prefer not to convert specific tariffs at the tariff line level for two reasons: first, trade data at 
such a level are not public information in all countries; and second, unit values are even far more volatile 
(see infra). 
Getting a Simplified Compound Tariff at the Six-Digit Level 
This first stage is performed by ITC under the following assumptions.  
To move from the tariff line to the six-digit level, we compute a simple average across the 
different tariff lines. All mixed tariffs are converted into compound tariffs by giving the primacy to the 
pure ad valorem component of the duty rate; if such a term does not exist, the compound tariff is kept. In 
the case of a mixed tariff with two compound components, only the first one is retained. 
We apply the same rule for the countries that we process separately from the ITC data set. 
The important choice made at this stage
11
1.  Aggregating tariff lines within an HS6 position is a more limited challenge than to aggregate 
tariffs over a large set of products. The number of lines is limited. A simple average reduces 
the risk associated with any aggregation and avoids the need of a complex aggregator. 
 is the use of a simple average to compute the six-digit 
tariff from the tariff line level. Using a simple average has several advantages: 
2.  It requires only information on tariffs. 
                                                       
8 Cubic meter for volume, square meter for area, and meter for length and unity. 
9 At the tariff line level, tariffs can be expressed as ad valorem, specific, compound (the sum of ad valorem and specific 
components), or mixed (combinations of ad valorem, specific, and compound tariffs with a complex operator such as Max or 
Min). 
10 Each or both components may be equal to zero. 
11 In reality, this issue concerns all levels of aggregation and will be discussed in section 0.  
9 
3.  At the detailed level, tariff peaks are more frequent and a trade-weighted average will be 
much more biased. 
Converting Physical Units 
At this point, a compound rate may have one or two specific components associated with different 
physical units (ton, unit, cubic meter, square meter, and so on). Therefore, we convert every specific term 
into monetary units per ton and sum them to get only one term. The conversion rate between physical 
units is provided by the BACI data set. It is important to note that the same rate is used for computing unit 
values. At the end of this second stage, we have a compound tariff with two components: one ad valorem 
and one specific in domestic currency per ton, both at the bilateral level and at the HS6 revision 1 
nomenclature. 
Converting Monetary Units 
The next step is to express all variables in the data sets in U.S. dollars, which implies converting the 
specific component into 2004 U.S. dollars. For this we rely on annual average exchange rates provided by 
the International Monetary Fund.  
The Choice of Unit Values 
The last stage in commuting specific tariffs into AVEs involves the choice of unit values. Such values 
play a major role because any measurement error will have a proportional effect on the AVE of the 
specific tariff. For instance, using overestimated unit values will decrease the level of protection. 
Figure 4.  Unit value heterogeneity 
 
Source: MAcMap-HS6v2; Laborde (2008). 
Note: The exporter reference group unit value (ERGUV) results are displayed before the implementation of the filter based on 
world unit value.  
10 
Using bilateral unit values at the product level is unsatisfactory given their high volatility, which 
is often caused by statistical errors (quantity badly notified, abusive rounding).
12 The volatility of unit 
values is illustrated in Figure 4, where we plot the distribution of the ratio between standard deviation and 
median of the unit values for 5,111 products, using different definitions: bilateral unit value, exporter unit 
value, exporter reference group unit value (ERGUV). This last concept was developed for the first version 
of MAcMap-HS6 at CEPII (see Bouët et al. 2004). All in all, to get a relevant AVE, we need unit values 
to match two features: stability and relevance compared with the price heterogeneity of different 
exporters. The ERGUV approach adequately responds to these requirements, as depicted in Figure 4. A 
cluster analysis is performed, grouping exporters into five groups, according to GDP per capita and trade 
openness. For each group, and for the whole world, a product unit value is computed using a weighted 
median of the trade data for the 2002–2004 periods.
13
Let us note that it is not only a statistical matter. Different concepts of unit value are useful in 
studying tariff protection: 
 To ensure the stability of the AVE obtained, we 
apply an additional filter: ERGUVs are limited to an interval comprising between one-third and three 
times the world median unit value; extreme values are capped by the limits of this range. 
•  Focusing on the protection faced by a country, unit values should consider the exporter 
specificities and the heterogeneity of export prices. Low-cost exporters (e.g., LDCs) are more 
affected by specific tariffs than high-cost exporters. We still prefer to use the ERGUV as a 
default unit value to assess AVE.
14
•  Concerning multilateral negotiations, or just to get a unique AVE for the most favoured 
nation (MFN) tariff, we need to use a single unit value by product and by importer. Different 
unit values all included in the database, meet this constraint: the world unit value, an importer 
unit value, and a unit value based on WTO recommendations (TN/AG/W/3 of July 12, 2006). 
See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the implementation of a tariff scenario in MAcMap-HS6. 
 However, in the complete database, we also provide the 
simple exporter unit value as an alternative. 
Once we have calculated the unit values, we compute the AVE of a compound tariff as follows: 
 
     (1) 
As we see in Figure 5, the differences in overall average agriculture protection using ERGUV and 
world unit value are small (correlation of 99 percent).
15
 
 However, using importing country unit values 
decreases protection. For Norway, the gap is more than 20 points. Such a result is unsurprising since the 
importer’s unit values include a share of quota rents and preferential margins. 
                                                       
12 For a relatively homogeneous product such as sugar, the non-weighted coefficient of variation of bilateral unit value is 
above 10,000%. 
13 A few nonmarket trade relations are discarded, such as food aid rice exports between Japan and North Korea valuated at 
Japanese domestic prices, because of a high level of bias in unit values. 
14 In the case of LDCs, if the use of the ERGUV can "increase" their real unit values (assuming they are low-cost exporters) 
and reduce the AVE, using exporter-specific unit values can also lead to similar biases if the share of the preferential margins 
they benefit is included in their export prices. 
15 As a matter of fact, the more disaggregated the figures, the wider the differences.  
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Figure 5.  Scatter plot of average agricultural protection using different unit values 
 
Source:  MAcMap-HS6v2; Laborde (2008). 
Note:  Each point represents one country. 
Tariff Rate Quotas 
Tariff rate quotas were introduced during the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) to replace simple quotas and 
have since been applied to agricultural trade. They improve market access conditions for some 
commodities protected with very high, sometimes prohibitive, tariffs. More precisely, TRQs combine a 
quantitative restriction and a two-tier tariff regime. Below the quota, imports under licenses face a 
preferential tariff (the in-quota tariff), and above the quota, the tariff applied equals or is very close to the 
MFN duty (the out-of-quota tariff). Taking this complex trade policy instrument into account when 
aiming to provide an AVE for a given tariff line is a challenge. The MAcMap-HS6 methodology provides 
a relevant assessment of the marginal protection related to TRQs at the HS6 level. 
Data Sources. A relevant treatment of TRQs requires a large set of good quality information, 
including tariff rates (in quota and out of quota),
16
For this purpose, David Laborde and Priscila Ramos, with the help of Olivier Lecina,
 the quota volume, the filling rate, and, sometimes, the 
quota allocation. Such information is usually poorly provided. 
17
                                                       
16 Out-of-quota tariffs are provided by the tariff information in MAcMap-HS6. In-quota tariffs are extracted from the other 
sources quoted as well as the APEC tariffs database. 
 have 
developed a specific data set. The starting point is version 1 of the MAcMap-HS6 TRQ data set, which 
displays 1,325 TRQs by reporter. Successively, we improve and update that data set with other sources. In 
particular, we rely on information contained in the 2005 Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD), 
which has 1,393 TRQs, and the more complete De Gorter’s data set (1,409 TRQs). All the information is 
controlled and updated with the WTO notifications. For several countries (China, the European Union, 
the United States), we have included preferential TRQs.  
17 The authors thank Harry de Gorter (see de Gorter and Kliauga 2006), Nicholas Grossman from the U.S. International 
Trade Commission, and Jacques Gallezot from the Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique for their contributions.  
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The comparison among different data sources helped us identify new and redundant TRQs, such 
as those offered by the new EU members (the Eastern European countries), and other TRQs, such as the 
Brazilian TRQs, which became irrelevant with the adoption of the MERCOSUR common external tariff. 
In addition, using different sources is crucial given the low level of information available in the core data 
set made by the WTO notifications. Indeed, out of the more than 1,434 TRQs registered at the WTO, only 
450 have minimal information to be used in WTO secretariat calculations on TRQ fill rate in 2003 (see 
WTO 2005). In addition, nearly all of them are administrated based on the “applied tariff” approach, 
meaning that TRQs are not relevant per se. At the end, we provide robust information related to 784 
TRQs for 32 reporting countries covering 493 HS6 products. 
Allocating TRQs at the bilateral and six-digit level. Some TRQs are defined at the eight-digit 
level, while others cover a set of products at the six- or four-digit level. Moreover, in some cases they are 
open to all countries and in others to a subset or even only one country. At the same time, one exporting 
country may be eligible for different TRQs (multilateral and/or preferential) when exporting one product 
to a specific country. Once the data have been collected, the next challenge is to bring the TRQ data set to 
the nomenclature used in MAcMap-HS6. Consequently, we split or aggregate all the information related 
to TRQs to obtain bilateral information at the six-digit level. 
This procedure has been vastly improved compared with the previous version of MAcMap-HS6. 
In that version, we used a simple proportional rule—that is, if country A represents X percent of effective 
imports of product i belonging to a TRQ offered by country B, we allocated X percent of its TRQ to 
country A for the product i. That strategy had several limitations, the most obvious of which is to allocate 
a share of a MFN TRQ even to an exporter that benefit from a duty-free, quota-free preferential access. 
We have eliminated it with a new approach.  
To define TRQs at the HS6 level, we developed an optimization program that aims to minimize 
tariff revenue collected by a country on imports related to TRQs.
18
Applying the optimization program to each importing country s lets us define the allocated 
quantity q
at for each quota TRQID to each exporter r, as well as the quota q
ef, as follows: 
 It includes as constraints the TRQ 
specificities (products, country eligibility, size), the effective trade information, and the whole tariff 
structure (in-quota and out-of-quota rates but also other preferential and MFN schemes). Therefore, the 
preferential margin related to a TRQ will influence the allocation structure of the quota across partners 
and products. For instance, if a TRQ covers different HS6 products, exporters will mainly use it for 
products on which the TRQ preferences (in-quota rates) are the greatest, compared with non-TRQ tariff 
rates. 
  (2) 
s.t.  
  (3) 
  (4) 
 
  (5) 
 
                                                       
18 This behavior can have two justifications. Quotas can be allocated by a central planner on the side of exporters or by a 
perfectly competitive process between exporters that will lead to an optimal allocation process.  
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  (6) 
 
  (7) 
where   denotes the total quantity of quota TRQID applied by country s;   
denotes the official share of quota TRQID allocated to the group of exporters, “group”;   
denotes the in-quota quantity used by exporter r in quota TRQID;   denotes the computed 
allocated quantity to exporter r in quota TRQID;   denotes the out-of-quota quantity;   
denotes the total quantity exported by r to s; AVE denotes the AVE of the in- or out-of-quota tariff; TR 
denotes the tariff revenue; and UV denotes the unit value. 
The objective function defined by equation 2 uses the square root of tariff revenue (TR) to obtain 
a nonlinear program (and a single solution)
19
The first constraint (equation 3) represents allocated quotas where a   of the 
quota TRQID is allocated to exporting countries r belonging to the eligible group of countries. One 
should keep in mind that several hs6 products may belong to the same quota TRQID. The next constraint 
(equation 4) defines the total size of the quota. Equation 5 implies that no quantity under quota q
ef should 
be above the allocated quota quantity q
at. The fourth constraint (equation 6) defines that all trade 
quantities q should take place inside,  , or outside,  , a quota. The last equation (equation 7) defines 
the tariff revenue collected on both the in-quota and out-of-quota quantities. 
 and to represent the idea of economies of scale in the quota 
license management. Therefore, the cost of protection perceived by exporters (objective) of exporting q 
units from n exporters inside a TRQ is greater than the cost of exporting nq units from one country. This 
leads to a more concentrated structure of quota utilization. 
It is important to underscore the fact that this program is compatible with different solutions for 
,. This is not a problem since we do not need to have information on the outside quantity by 
TRQID. Only the   is needed. 
MAcMap-HS6 TRQ Regimes 
Based on the results of the previous optimization program that defined 
), we compute the filling rate for each TRQ. It is defined at the TRQ level 
for a nonallocated TRQ and at the allocation level for an allocated TRQ.
20
•  When the fill rate is lower than 90 percent, the quota is not binding (in-quota regime or 
regime 0 in MAcMap-HS6 database), and the marginal tariff used in MAcMap-HS6, 
, is the in-quota tariff ( ). 
 The filling rates help to define 
three TRQ regimes, as in the previous version of MAcMap-HS6. The marginal tariff applied on imports 
under a TRQ will depend on the filling rate: 
•  If the fill rate is between 90 and 98 percent, we consider the quota to be binding (at-quota 
regime or regime 1 in MAcMap-HS6), and the marginal tariff is the simple average between 
the in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs ( ). 
                                                       
19 With a linear objective, the optimization process will produce a set of solutions with an infinite number of potential 
permutations between different exporters inside each quota. 
20 In other words, a nonallocated TRQ will have only one fill rate (and regime) in the database. On the contrary, a TRQ with 
one share allocated to country A and another to country B will have two fill rates and potentially two different regimes.  
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•  Finally, when the fill rate exceeds 98 percent, over-quota imports are allowed (out-of-quota 
regime or regime 2 in MAcMap-HS6), and the marginal tariff is the out-of-quota one 
( ).  
The rule of simple average is used for the intermediate case because we do not have information 
about the effective domestic price and, thus, the effective marginal distortion. 
In addition, a specific treatment is performed for South Korea for which MFN rates (and outside 
rates) are very high but where a discretionary treatment of the TRQ (annual TRQ creation) introduces 
significant market access. Therefore, we use new estimates of marginal protection rates for maize and 
soya based on U.S. Department of Agriculture analysis. 
Assessing the Impact of MAcMap-HS6 TRQ Treatment 
Table 2 displays the consequences of the TRQ treatment on the overall average agricultural 
protection for some countries. For Canada, a high fill rate leads to the use of the out-of-quota rate in most 
cases: the marginal rate is unaffected by the TRQ, but a rent is generated. On the other hand, for South 
Korea, TRQ management provides significant market access and reduces its average rate of protection by 
20 points. Overall, the MAcMap-HS6 treatment provides an average protection (18.8 percent) at an 
intermediary level between the inside rate (14.7 percent) and the outside rate (22 percent). 
Table 2.  Average agricultural protection with and without TRQ treatment (percentage) 






Canada  5.7  15.9  17.3 
China  10.6  11.1  25.9 
European Union  16.1  21.3  24.2 
Japan  20.0  28.2  31.6 
Panama  13.1  15.8  17.7 
South Africa  12.6  15.1  18.0 
South Korea  23.8  36.8  55.0 
Switzerland  30.1  54  83.6 
United States  3.8  8.9  9.9 
All countries with TRQ  14.7  18.8  22.0 
Source: MAcMap-HS6v2; Laborde (2008). 
Note:  Reference group weighting scheme. The average figures concern all agricultural products including those without TRQs. 
Concerning the computation of TRQ rents, two alternatives are provided, depending on their 
attribution. Indeed, rents can be captured by exporters or importers depending on administration methods 
(see Skully 2001 for a discussion of the economics of administration methods) or market structures. Rent 
values may be included in the cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) trade values or not. So, under TRQ 
regimes 1 and 2, we have two potential formulas for rent values: 
If the rents are captured by the importer, we have the following at the product and bilateral level: 
 
   (8) 
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with   , denoting the marginal  
 
rate of protection,   denoting the bilateral trade value,  
and   denoting the share of imports using the TRQ. 
If rents are captured by the exporter, the CIF trade value includes the rents and we have the 
following at the product and bilateral level: 
            (9) 
As shown in Table 3, the TRQ rents in MAcMap-HS6v2 total $7.7 billion if we assume that rents 
are captured by importers, or $3.9 billion if rents are captured by exporters (and included in the CIF trade 
value). 
Table 3.  TRQ rent values (in millions of USD) 
      Assumption: Rents captured 
by the importer 
Assumption: Rents captured by 
the exporter 















  [A]  [B]  [C]  [D]  [E]  [F]  [G]  [H] 
Canada  1727  1027  364  663  2754  203  634  2847 
China  5201  344  344  0  5544  249  0  5544 
Japan  2974  2967  1907  1059  5941  794  948  6409 
South Korea  3755  2121  428  1693  5876  192  1626  6925 
Panama  26  10  5  5  36  3  5  40 
Switzerland  1913  1686  960  726  3599  356  700  3836 
United 
States 
8595  2021  1547  475  10616  1050  465  11071 
European 
Union 
11636  6046  1693  4353  17682  871  4235  21137 
All countries 
with TRQs 
38387  17800  7679  10120  56187  3928  9710  63606 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
* Total imports (in and out of quota) for all products related to TRQs. 
It is important to keep in mind that using the MAcMap-HS6 marginal rate of protection without 
using the associated rent values will lead to a bias in the cost of protection and tariff revenue 
measurement; symmetrically the gain of liberalization will be biased. Both approaches have different 
implications in terms of valuation of imports at domestic prices and tariff revenue. 
Assuming that rents are captured by the importer, we can define different relations for each 




•   
•  Imports at domestic price:  
=  
=  
In this case, using the AVE provided by MAcMap-HS6 and the CIF trade values allows us to 
derive the right domestic price values. However, the actual tariff revenue is 
. 




•   
•  Imports at domestic price:  
=  
=  
In this case, using the AVE provided by MAcMap-HS6 and the CIF trade values does not allow 
us to derive the right domestic price values. We need to correct this to avoid a double-counting of the 
distortions on inside-quota quantity. Then, the actual tariff revenue becomes  
. 
From Table 3, we can see that neglecting TRQ rents will lead to an overestimation of tariff 
revenue by 75 percent on average (the difference between columns G or D and B), and up to 325 percent 
for the U.S. case. The choice concerning rent allocation changes the valuation of imports at the domestic 
price by 13 percent (20 percent in the U.S. case). Therefore, users should consider carefully both issues 
when using MAcMap-HS6 marginal tariffs. 
Additional Treatments 
After merging tariff data and the TRQ data set, we implement two additional steps. 
Defining the MFN Tariffs 
We add the MFN applied rates to the initial database, containing bilateral applied rates. This step is not 
immediate since the MFN rate is not provided in the ITC source data. For the countries for which we have  
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directly processed the tariff schedule, this information is available. However, for all the other countries 
(ITC data set), we recomputed the MFN rate from the information contained in the database using the 
following search algorithm: 
•  AVEs are computed using importer-specific unit values (the same for all exporters). 
•  AVEs are ranked by decreasing values across WTO partners (other partners are discarded). 
•  The top five values are discarded to avoid oddities (such as WTO retaliation). 
•  We keep the tariff information (whole structure) for the first AVE that is repeated across 
three exporters. 
The latter value is considered to be the MFN rate. 
Merging with Bound Tariffs 
We finally merge this applied tariff database with an updated version of the bound tariff database 
developed by Bchir, Jean, and Laborde (2006). Recently acceded members are included as are bound 
tariffs renegotiated through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) article XXVIII 
procedure. Consistency checks are performed between bound MFN, applied MFN, and preferential rates. 
Applied rates are capped to their bound level if the commitments should have been enforced by 2004 and 
the trade relations belong to WTO. Only a few cases, such as the U.S.-Cuba trade relations, where the 
United States applies non-WTO tariffs against Cuba for political reasons, remain unchanged. 
Adding bound tariffs allows for a quality control, but more important, it enables one to compute 
WTO tariff scenarios properly (see Appendix 1). 
Last, as in the previous version of MacMap-HS6, we avoid the water in tariff
21 problem by 
capping all AVE tariffs at 1,000 percent, avoiding very high AVEs that may alter average figures without 
economic relevance.
22
Comparing the final AVE at the six-digit level included in MAcMap-HS6v2 and the original data 
sources, we build Table 5. We decompose the distribution of the final AVE by source of the information: 
directly extracted from the MFN tariffs of TRAINS, MAcMap from ITC (primary extraction) and 
MAcMap-HS6 (values generated/modified by the methodology described therein). First, we see that 
nearly two-thirds of the rows of the data set (66.58 percent) are directly based on TRAINS information; 
indeed, this share is mainly MFN relations and/or pure ad valorem tariffs. However, in terms of trade, this 
share is reduced (59.74 percent) since trade will be upward biased by preferential agreements. In addition 
to TRAINS inputs, the MAcMap-ITC data set is directly used for 20 percent (in average) of the 
MAcMapHS6 database. Finally, our specific treatments modify 19.61 percent of the AVE in terms of 
trade flows. This is particularly true for the agricultural products (26.95 percent), where both specific 
tariffs and TRQs play a very important role. 
 
                                                       
21 Binding overhang and water in tariff are two different notions. Water in tariff is a more general case where a tariff 
reduction will not lead to trade creation. Even without binding overhang, we can have a 3,000% tariff reduced to a 2,500% tariff 
with no trade creation—both being prohibitive. 
22 We assume that tariffs above 1,000% are prohibitive tariffs, but for some reason, such as a tariff exemption, trade flows 
take place.  
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Table 4.  Decomposition of the final data set by source 
  Share of trade  Share of HS6 tariff lines 












MAcMap-HS6  18.98%  26.95%  19.61%  11.34%  18.87%  12.36% 
MAcMap-ITC  20.88%  17.94%  20.65%  21.51%  18.20%  21.06% 
TRAINS - MFN  60.14%  55.11%  59.74%  67.15%  62.93%  66.58% 
Total  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00% 
Source: MAcMap-HS6v2 and initial data sets. Authors’ computations. 
Note: TRAINS data set refers here to a partial extraction of the TRAINS database limited to the MFN rates and the two main 
preferential agreements (EU and NAFTA). 
Aggregating Tariffs 
Even if MAcMap-HS6 provides disaggregated information, most applications (CGE analysis, 
econometrics matching tariff data and domestic production/consumption series) using protection data will 
require aggregated tariffs. The task is still a challenge for applied economists; none of the existing 
solutions is perfect.  
Different Methods 
The way tariffs are aggregated is crucial.
23
The trade-weighted average remains the most widespread method in applied research. It preserves 
the hierarchy between different products, but at the same time it suffers from the endogeneity problem 
between protection and trade: a prohibitive tariff forbids any import, which in turn means no weight. So 
when tariff peaks exist, this technique moves the protection level downward compared with the simple 
average, which puts relatively more weight on non-traded tariff lines.  
 A simple average between tariffs, largely used by the WTO for 
consolidated duties, is an indicator a priori neutral. However, it has two major limitations. It depends on 
the degree of disaggregation of the tariff structure of a country (number of tariff lines); and, most 
important, it has a poor level of economic relevance because it gives the same weight to a highly 
important product as it does to a marginal one. 
Other weights, such as production or national consumption, may conceivably capture the 
distortions met by the producers or the consumers (see Bach and Martin 2001). In both cases the 
endogeneity problem is avoided, but another problem arises: data on consumption and production are not 
available at the same highly disaggregated level as trade data. 
Let us note that the calculation of the average, whatever the method used, causes us to lose 
information about the distribution of the tariffs. Some sophisticated aggregators exist, such as the Trade 
Restrictiveness Index and the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index developed by Anderson and Neary 
(2005), which are uniform tariff equivalents that maintain the same value of trade or a welfare equivalent 
measure, whose variations can be related to changes in the generalized mean and variance of the tariff 
schedule. 
                                                       
23 Since no good aggregation scheme exists, we should be cautious when using the terms “overestimate” or “underestimate.” 
The reference point is always subjective, and this assessment is always conducted by comparing one aggregator to another.  
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These indicators lean on a theoretical justification; however, they rely on numerous assumptions 
about demand elasticities.
24
The original approach proposed by CEPII (Bouët et al. 2004) aims to limit the endogeneity bias, 
preserving the specificities of the trade structures without requiring any assumptions on the demand 
parameters. The approach is designed to use an instrumental variable for bilateral trade that reduces the 
endogeneity bias. Following this “reference group” methodology, bilateral applied tariffs are aggregated 
using the exports of a given country toward a group of countries (the reference group) to which the import 
country belongs, instead of bilateral trade. Since different countries pertaining to the same reference 
group share common demand features but different trade policies—due to a different political-economic 
equilibrium, for instance—the endogeneity bias is reduced.  
 And more important, using a constant elasticity of substitution framework, 
they do not deal satisfactorily with the endogeneity problem between trade and tariff, especially for 
prohibitive tariffs.  
World trade may appear to be a good weighting scheme, as it eliminates the endogeneity 
problem, but it also suppresses the specific features of trade patterns for exporters and importers. 
The initial formula of the reference group weight was defined in Bouët et al. (2002) and updated 
in Bouët et al. (2008). We propose in this paper a slightly modified version: 
  (10) 
 
  (11) 
where r is the exporter, s is the importer, i is the HS6 product, Grp(s) represents the reference group of 
country s,   represents the imports of country s from r in product i; and the ‘.’ index represents the 
sum over the related dimension. 
It can be noted that the difference is in the denominator of  . Here we subtract 
the   that corresponds to the export of a country r to its reference group. The uncorrected 
version of this weighting scheme used in the previous version of MAcMap-HS6 created a virtual weight 
for an irrelevant relation: the trade between r and r when r exports to its reference group. The corrected 
version guarantees that the sum of   matches the sum of trade flows ( ). However, the term 
 is a scaling factor used to ensure relevant aggregation across importers, and its 
definition matters only in this case. Previous weights were underestimating the role of importing countries 
that belong to one group in which intragroup trade is important, when computing the average across 
groups (e.g., world average).  
Comparing different Weighting Schemes 
In this section, we compare how the world average protection varies when using different weights. Five 
different aggregating schemes are considered: bilateral trade, the reference group methodology (five 
different groups), the reference group world, the world trade, and the simple average. Remember that in 
the case of the world trade, all the exporter countries have the same structure of aggregation on each 
                                                       
24 Important recent research has provided new elasticity-of-import-demand estimates at the HS6 level (see Kee, Nicita, and 
Olarreaga 2008). But all products are not covered by these estimates, and for agricultural products past and present quantitative 
measures strongly hamper the validity of the results. Armington elasticities at the HS6 level are still poorly available (see 
Femenia and Gohin 2007).  
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market. In the case of the reference group world, each exporter applies its own export structure (with the 
world as partner). 
Table 5 clearly shows that the average world protection follows what the theory predicts. The 
simple average increases the measure of protection, while the bilateral trade reduces it. The measure 
decreases from 19.5 to 14.9 percent in agriculture and from 10.9 to 3.4 percent in the industrial sector, 
respectively. 
The level of protection is particularly high in the agricultural sector when the world trade and the 
reference group world are used as aggregators, because of the concentration of protection on certain 
products in certain countries (e.g., rice). 
In the industrial sector, the difference between the simple average and the weighted average is 
marked. This is due to raw materials, oil in particular, that is taxed lightly or not at all but at the same 
time represents an important part of world trade, covering a limited number of tariff lines. The reference 
group method yields intermediate figures, limiting the endogeneity bias. 
Table 2.  World average rate of protection using alternative weighting schemes 
Weighting scheme  Agricultural goods  Non-agricultural goods 
Bilateral imports  14.9  3.4 
Reference groups (five)  18.9  4.1 
“World” reference group  22.3  4.4 
World trade  20.8  5.6 
Simple average  19.5  10.9 
Source: MAcMap-HS6v2; Laborde (2008). 
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3.  PATTERN OF PROTECTION IN 2004 
Using MAcMap-HS6v2, we develop a snapshot of the world’s applied tariffs. We first present a general 
overview of protection in 2004. Next, we focus on the main characteristics of a select panel of countries. 
Finally, we concentrate on the sectoral issue.  
Unless otherwise noted, comments in the text refer to tariffs calculated with the reference group 
methodology. 
Overview of Applied Tariffs 
The world average protection in 2004 is 5.1 percent (see Table 6), acknowledging the fact that 40 percent 
of world trade takes place under duty-free MFN rates. This relatively low AVE number hides a 
heterogeneous and complex pattern of protection, reflecting historical and political differences across 
countries and sectors. Here is a quick overview: 
•  The average level of protection decreases as the level of a country’s development increases: 
in 2004, the average protection is 3.3 percent for high-income countries (HICs), 9.7 percent 
for middle-income countries, and 12.1 percent for least-developed countries. 
•  The agricultural sector is more protected (18.9 percent) than the manufactured goods sector 
(4.5 percent) or the extractive-energy products sector (1.3 percent). This gap naturally reflects 
the particular place of agriculture in the political economy of most countries as well as the 
mechanical consequences of agriculture’s exclusion from previous cycles of GATT. Out of 
170 countries available in our base, only 11
25
•  Final goods are more protected than intermediate goods. This progressivity aims to increase 
the effective protection of the locally produced value-added. All in all, the practice of tariff 
progressivity biases exports toward unprocessed resource-based commodities.  
 have average applied rates for agriculture that 
are lower than their industrial applied rates.  
The protectionist bias in agriculture and on final products rises with the level of development of a 
country. Relative to their average level of protection, HICs give appreciably more protection to their 
agricultural sector. Indeed, rich countries tax their agricultural imports 6.7 times more than manufacturing 
goods. The ratio of agricultural protection to industrial protection decreases for MICs and LDCs: 2.3 and 
1.2, respectively. MICs and LDCs, with scarce administrative resources, focus their trade policies on a 
few objectives (in primis, fiscal revenue collection).  
                                                       
25 Australia, Bahamas, Brazil, Belarus, Cambodia, Mayotte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Maldives, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Uzbekistan, Yemen.  
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Table 6.  World protection in 2004 by categories of countries and goods 
Goods  World  HICs  MICs  LDCs 
Agricultural goods  18.9  18.0  20.8  14.1 
of which:             
      Primary and semi-processed  12.8  12.1  14.2  9.5 
      Final  22.8  21.7  25.4  16.8 
Industrial goods  4.4  2.7  8.9  11.7 
of which:             
      Primary and semi-processed  2.8  1.2  6.2  10.9 
      Final  5.0  2.9  9.9  11.9 
Extraction and energy products  1.9  0.6  5.6  12.7 
of which:             
      Primary and semi-processed  1.4  0.3  4.6  14.4 
      Final  3.3  1.4  7.6  11.2 
All products  5.1  3.3  9.6  12.2 
of which:              
       Primary and semi-processed  3.3  1.8  6.8  11.4 
       Final  6.0  3.9  11.0  12.4 
Source: Laborde (2008); MAcMap-HS6v2; reference group system of weights. 
Note: HICs stands for high-income countries, and MICs stands for middle-income countries. Both categories are defined by the 
World Bank. LDCs are the least-developed countries as defined by the United Nations. Differentiation by level of transformation 
follows the broad economic activities (BEC) United Nations nomenclature. Agricultural products are defined using the WTO 
classification.  
The extraction and energy products category corresponds to chapters 25, 26, and 27 of the HS. 
Figure 6 represents the distribution of protection structure by plotting the average protection 
normalized by world protection versus the ratio of agricultural protection divided by industrial protection. 
It is clear that most countries are in the upper-right quarter of the space defined by the vertical line 
corresponding to even protection between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and the horizontal line 
corresponding to the world average protection. Countries below the horizontal line are HICs or MICs 
from Asia and South America. Countries to the left of the vertical line are the 11 countries listed 
previously (agricultural protection lower than non-agricultural protection). The lower-left quadrant 
contains only two countries: Hong Kong, at the origin of the axis,
26 and Singapore. The few HICs with 
protection levels above the world average are some Caribbean countries (South America [SA] group in 
the figure 6) e.g. Bahamas or Gulf countries (Asia). On the whole, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries mainly differentiate themselves by moving along the 
horizontal axis. For LDCs (black-filled circles and diamonds), it is the reverse—they distribute 
themselves along the vertical axis. Middle-income African countries, whose average protection is the 
highest (more than 2.5 times the average world protection), tax industrial imports more than agricultural 
ones so as to increase their fiscal revenue.
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26 The ratio of agricultural protection to industrial protection is set at 0 for Hong Kong even if it is undefined. 
 Overall, they often adopt maybe more protectionist but 
simpler policies than the complex and the heterogeneous tariff schedules of HICs.  
27 Due to their diversity, it may be difficult to generalize for all African MICs. However, most of them are concentrated in 
Figure 3 between 1 and 2 for the agriculture: industry ratio and between 2.8 and 5 for the domestic protection: world average 
ratio.   
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As was said before, if average tariffs are relevant synthetic indicators, they often hide quite 
heterogeneous situations, among countries and sectors. The next two sections are devoted to looking at 
this heterogeneity. 
Figure 6.  Applied protection by level of development 
 
Source: Adapted from Laborde (2008); MAcMap-HS6v2; reference group weighting scheme. 
Country Results 
Appendix 2 shows the average protection applied by each country, for all products and three 
disaggregated sectors (agricultural, non-agricultural, energy) calculated with two different weighting 
systems (reference group and trade weighted). The next subsection discusses this heterogeneity among 
countries. However, looking at average protection by country does not allow for capturing the strong 
dispersion of tariff rates in each country. Therefore, the following subsection investigates tariff dispersion 
with each country’s tariff schedule.  
Average Protection 
Focusing on countries, the most protectionist importers (29 percent or more) are islands (Solomon 
Islands, Seychelles, Bermuda, Bahamas) for which duties are the main sources of fiscal revenue (see 
Appendix 2 for a complete list and Figure 7 for selected countries).  
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Figure 1. Average applied protection in 2004, selected countries 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; MAcMap-HS6v2; reference group weighting scheme. 
A second group of 30 countries is essentially formed by some African countries (Nigeria, 
Burundi, Sudan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) whose global tariff rate is between 13 and 29 percent. 
India, with an average rate of 19 percent, twice the Russian Federation’s rate (non–WTO member), is one 
of WTO’s most protectionist members, at least among emerging economies. 
A third group of 78 countries is composed of more liberal emerging economies with an average 
protection rate between 5 and 12 percent. For instance, China’s protection rate is as high as South 
Korea’s: 7.9 percent. This figure, however, considers neither the end of the implementation of China’s 
WTO commitments, nor the fact that more than half of industrial Chinese imports benefit from a duty 
drawback system.  
The last group of 28 countries—OECD countries, Gulf countries, several transition economies—
is made up of those whose applied tariff is lower than 5 percent.  
As we emphasized earlier in the section on methodology, the weighting system is crucial for 
countries with tariff peaks. For the European Union, the reference group methodology increases the 
average protection by 28 percent (2.5 percent for trade weighed and 3.2 percent for reference group 
weighted). The difference is even larger for the United States (+56 percent, from 1.6 to 2.5 percent) and 
Switzerland (+84 percent, from 2.5 to 4.6 percent). Inversely, differences are minor for countries with a 
more uniform tariff structure, even if highly protected, such as Pakistan or Bangladesh. 
Tariff Dispersion 
Thanks to a disaggregated database, we can assess the tariff dispersion for each country. This feature is 
important because it illustrates not only the role of political-economic forces and special interests in 
shaping tariff patterns but also the welfare cost of trade policies that increases with tariff heterogeneity. 
We see that high tariff heterogeneity is driven by both the difference between the average agricultural 
tariff and non-agricultural tariff and also a strong variance of tariffs within the agricultural sector.  
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In Table 7, we provide the coefficient of variation, the skewness, and the excess of kurtosis of the 
distributions of the power of tariff
28
Even if we must be careful when looking at world-level figures that result from both intercountry 
and within-country tariff heterogeneity, we can underscore some key figures of the power of tariff 
distribution pattern. First, the total coefficient of variation of the power of MFN tariff is equal to 82 
percent for all products but equals 11 percent for non-agricultural products and 210 percent for 
agricultural products. So, at the global level, tariff heterogeneity is driven by the opposition between 
agricultural and non-agricultural products (as noted before) but even more by tariff heterogeneity across 
agricultural products. Unsurprisingly, the skewness is positive (764): the distribution is right-tailed. This 
is particularly true for the total distribution where relatively higher tariffs in agriculture lead to a very flat 
right tail. The skewness coefficient for nonagriculture is relatively low (3) and much stronger within 
agriculture (285). As for the kurtosis, its value, above 60,000, is strongly positive: the distribution is 
leptokurtic. This feature is correlated with the explanation that agricultural protection leads to a very flat 
tail on the right in opposition to a high concentration of tariffs in the middle of the distribution. Shifting 
from MFN tariffs to bilateral applied tariffs does not change the global picture: indeed, at the world level, 
unweighted indicators are poorly affected by preferences that remain a minor issue.
 for several countries. Countries that present the most extreme values 
for each indicator are selected. We compute these indicators not only for applied MFN tariffs (product 
heterogeneity) but also for applied bilateral tariffs (mix of product heterogeneity and preferential 
schemes). In the latter case, we compute unweighted indicators based on the whole database. We display 
detailed results for all products, agricultural products, and non-agricultural products aggregates. Indeed, it 
is relevant to see whether a distorted distribution is explained by a simple opposition between agricultural 
and non-agricultural products with a normal distribution within each category or by a globally distorted 
tariff structure. 
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At the country level, the coefficient of variation of the power of tariff varies widely from 0 
percent in Hong Kong and 1 percent in Chile to 606 percent in the Solomon Islands. Except for insular 
economies, Egypt has the largest value for developing countries (121 percent). Among rich countries, 
Iceland (117 percent), Norway (77 percent), and Switzerland (51 percent) have the most distorted trade 
policies. In general, intra-agriculture variation is stronger than intra-industry variation for developed 
countries and most developing countries. However, we can find the reverse situation for countries with 
comparative advantages in agriculture (Australia, Argentina, Georgia).
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We find a right-tailed distribution for nearly all countries except for a few developing ones—for 
instance, Bolivia and Georgia in both agricultural and non-agricultural products. The case of Chile is also 
interesting. Even if Chile applies a nearly homogeneous 6 percent MFN rate in 2004, it has some product 
exceptions. In non-agriculture, some goods can enter duty free (e.g., ships) and in agriculture some goods 
face a 25 percent tariff (e.g., frozen cuts of turkey). Therefore, the agricultural distribution is right-tailed 
(tariff “peaks” on poultry) and the non-agricultural goods distribution is left-tailed. For other countries, 
we check the global picture described before: the distribution of agricultural tariffs is more right-tailed 
than for non-agricultural goods (except for Norway, New Zealand, and Turkmenistan for countries 
 Whereas Australia and New 
Zealand have a coefficient of variation significantly higher in industry (respectively, 6 and 9 percent), 
other rich countries display the same level of dispersion (between 3 and 4 percent) in this sector. 
However, they differ strongly in their heterogeneity within the agricultural sector (2 percent for Australia, 
206 percent for Iceland). In the case of LDCs, we see that the distortions are quite homogeneous across 
sectors (Bangladesh with a coefficient of variation of 9 percent, Senegal with 6 percent, Burundi with 
values between 10 and 12 percent).  
                                                       
28 We use the power of tariff instead of the tariff value to get more meaningful results, especially when we want to compare 
indicators across countries. For instance, country with average is close to 0 any tariff (even 3% or 4%) will lead to an infinite 
coefficient of variation. 
29 The global bilateral relations are a (171 - 24) x (209 - 24 - 1) bilateral matrix (the EU25 is considered to be only one 
region). Preferential agreements and unilateral preferences covered only a very small number of these relations. 
30 But not always. See the case of New Zealand.  
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presented in Table 7), and the overall distribution is more right-tailed than the sub distribution. This last 
result is driven by an average agricultural tariff higher than the non-agricultural tariff. 
Most countries have a highly concentrated tariff distribution with a very high kurtosis coefficient; 
their variance is due more to infrequent extreme deviations than to frequent modestly sized deviations, 
especially for countries with very extreme trade policies such as New Zealand, Norway, and Singapore. 
Because of its nearly homogeneous structure, Chile also has a very leptokurtic distribution in agriculture, 
non-agriculture, and overall.  
However, many developing countries have a platykurtic distribution overall with a coefficient 
close to 0: Argentina, Bangladesh, West Africa Economic and Monetary Union countries (Senegal, Côte 
d’Ivoire), Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, and so on. Looking only at non-agricultural 
products presents a different picture: several countries, including the European Union and Canada but not 
the United States, have a low kurtosis value showing more even distribution.  
Looking at bilateral rates modifies the previous picture for a few cases. If we compare the United 
States and the European Union, we see that the coefficient of variation slightly decreases for the European 
Union (14 to 11 percent) and slightly increases for the United States (8 to 10 percent). A similar evolution 
takes place for the overall kurtosis. The European Union preferential schemes are so numerous and have 
such large product coverage that they drive a lot of tariffs to 0, close to the mean, in particular by 
weakening the agricultural MFN barriers. The European Union distribution is then more concentrated and 
less distorted (relatively less tariff peaks). On the contrary, for the United States preferences are still 
limited both in terms of partners and product coverage. In this case, introducing preferences, in particular 
since they avoid tariff peaks just increases the variance of tariffs by introducing some exceptions.   
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Table 7.  Coefficient of variation, skewness, and kurtosis of the power of tariff distribution 
  MFN applied rates  Bilateral applied rates 
  Coef. of variation  Skewness  Kurtosis  Coef. of variation  Skewness  Kurtosis 
  All  N-agr  Agr  All  N-agr  Agr  All  N-agr  Agr  All  Agr  All  Agr  All  Agr 
Argentina  6  7  4  0  0  0  -1  -1  0  6  5  0  0  -1  0 
Australia  6  6  2  2  2  4  5  5  29  5  2  3  6  7  60 
Bangladesh  9  9  9  0  0  -1  -1  -1  -1  9  9  0  -1  -1  -1 
Bolivia  2  2  0  -4  -3  -21  11  9  459  2  1  -3  -6  7  37 
Botswana  20  10  45  41  1  22  2E3  1  541  19  45  41  23  2E3  563 
Burundi  12  12  10  0  1  -1  -2  -2  0  12  11  0  -1  -2  -1 
Canada  17  5  40  11  2  4  136  2  17  10  24  9  4  100  15 
Chile  1  0  1  22  -18  13  787  326  165  1  2  -1  4  27  50 
Côte d’Ivoire  6  6  6  0  0  0  -2  -2  -2  6  6  0  0  -2  -2 
Egypt  121  11  233  20  1  7  396  2  49  114  227  21  7  447  56 
EU25  14  3  30  10  1  4  150  1  22  11  25  12  5  227  31 
Georgia  3  3  1  -1  -1  -10  0  0  92  3  3  -1  -4  1  12 
Hong Kong  0  0  0                    0  0             
Iceland  117  4  206  45  2  17  2E3  1  315  117  215  47  17  2E3  330 
Iran  22  22  23  2  1  4  10  0  44  22  23  2  4  10  44 
Japan  47  3  93  16  2  6  343  7  45  26  56  17  7  468  65 
Mauritania  7  7  7  0  0  0  -2  -2  -2  7  7  0  0  -2  -2 
Mauritius  23  24  21  1  1  1  0  0  1  23  20  1  1  1  1  
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Table 7.  Continued 
  MFN applied rates  Bilateral applied rates 
  Coef. of variation  Skewness  Kurtosis  Coef. of 
variation 
Skewness  Kurtosis 
  All  N-agr  Agr  All  N-agr  Agr  All  N-agr  Agr  All  Agr  All  Agr  All  Agr 
Mongolia  5  5  4  -1  -1  5  3  0  57  5  4  -1  5  3  56 
Mozambique  9  8  9  1  1  0  -2  -1  -2  9  9  1  0  -2  -2 
New Zealand  14  9  30  35  28  21  2E3  1E3  489  11  25  49  25  3E3  704 
Norway  77  5  125  44  38  18  3E3  2E3  402  72  125  46  18  3E3  417 
Qatar  3  1  7  21  17  8  474  298  69  3  7  19  8  431  71 
Russian Federation  6  5  8  2  0  5  20  -1  40  6  8  2  4  16  36 
Senegal  6  6  6  0  0  0  -2  -2  -2  6  6  0  0  -2  -2 
Singapore  1  0  3  61     22  4E3     513  1  3  64  23  4E3  558 
Solomon Islands  606  20  1E3  71  1  26  5E3  16  677  606  1E3  71  26  5E3  672 
South Africa  20  10  45  41  1  22  2E3  1  536  19  44  42  23  2E3  576 
Switzerland  51  7  84  14  7  5  326  97  51  37  69  18  7  571  92 
Turkmenistan  21  15  39  14  14  8  308  403  91  21  39  14  8  318  93 
USA  8  4  17  10  2  5  147  6  32  10  17  194  6  1E5  37 
Vanuatu  56  12  131  38  8  15  2E3  117  241  56  131  38  15  1681  239 
World  82  11  209  764  3  285  6E5  39  8E4  82  210  773  289  6E5  8E4 
Source: Authors’ calculations; MAcMap-HS6v2; unweighted computation based on the exhaustive data set. 
Note: x E y should be read x. 10
y; for example, 1E3 = 1,000. 
All = all products; N-agr = non-agricultural products; and Agr = agricultural products.  
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Sectoral Results 
As just demonstrated, tariff heterogeneity is quite important across products and tariff peaks are still 
numerous.  
Average Protection and Tariff Progressivity 
Beyond the general comments centered on Table 6 that have emphasized the strong difference between 
agricultural and non-agricultural protection,
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The HS2 classification disaggregates international trade into almost 100 sectors, and thus, this 
decomposition offers a quick but exhaustive picture of world protection. As already seen, the overall 
agricultural sector is far more protected than industry. The same pattern applies when we look at the HS2 
level. 
 we can attune the analysis based on Table 8.  
Thereby, the 15 most protected categories belong to the agricultural sector. Sugar is a commodity 
that faces tariffs higher than 40 percent worldwide. Dairy products, tobacco, meat, cereals, and alcohol 
are close behind sugar and show average rates systematically higher than 20 percent. As previously 
explained, historical context explains a large part of this ranking: almost all countries in the world 
vigorously protect their agriculture. Fiscal policies may also explain the rank of tobacco or alcohol, as 
they have very low demand elasticities.  
Among the highly ranked industrial categories in Table 8, one can distinguish very sensitive areas 
in trade negotiations such as apparel and textiles, with average tariffs around 10 percent. These categories 
occupy eight positions between ranks 16 to 23 of the most protected areas. Apparel is, however, more 
protected than textiles: the protection rate is 12.2 percent for knitted and crocheted fabrics and 11.7 
percent for special woven fabrics, but only 8.8 percent for cotton and 8.2 percent for silk. 
Beyond apparel and textiles, the car and truck industry is the most protected (9.1 percent), more 
so than ceramics (7.7 percent), plastics (6.2 percent), and glass products (5.9 percent). In this interval also 
lie fisheries (6.6 percent) and the residual agricultural categories like live trees and cut flowers (7.3 
percent), coffee and tea (6.5 percent), vegetable products (5.8 percent), and oil seeds (5.6 percent). The 
least protected agricultural class is gums and resins (4.9 percent). Processed chemical products are more 
protected than other industrial sectors on average: these include explosives (7 percent), soaps and washing 
preparations (5.9 percent), tanning or dyeing extracts (5.6 percent), and fertilizers (5.5 percent). Iron and 
steel products also enjoy above average protection among non-agricultural goods (5.2 versus 4.4 
percent).
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The least protected areas all belong to the manufacturing sector. Essential goods such as 
pharmaceutical products (1.8 percent) or cultural goods (1.4 percent) often benefit from specific national 
policies and low tariff protection. Last, trade in extraction sectors (HS27, HS26) is weakly taxed (2 and 1 
percent, respectively). 
 
                                                       
31 Differences that are mainly driven by the OECD trade policies. 
32 See Table 6.  
30 
Table 8. World average protection by HS2 chapter (in decreasing ranking) 
HS2  Label  AVE  HS2  Label  AVE 
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery  42.6  53  Other vegetable textile, paper yarn  5.8 
04  Dairy produce, bird eggs, honey  37.8  14  Vegetable plaiting materials   5.8 
02  Meat and edible meat offal  34.7  43  Fur skins and artificial fur  5.8 
24  Tobacco and manufactured substitutes  28.3  12  Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits   5.6 
11  Products of the milling industry  26.4  32  Tanning or dyeing extracts  5.5 
10  Cereals  24.7  31  Fertilizers  5.5 
22  Beverages, spirits, and vinegar  18.2  40  Rubber and articles thereof  5.2 
15  Animal or vegetable fats and oils  17.5  83  Miscellaneous articles of base metal  5.2 
21  Miscellaneous edible preparations  16.2  05  Products of animal origin n.e.s.  5.2 
20  Preparations of vegetables, fruit, or 
nuts 
16.2  73  Articles of iron or steel  5.2 
16  Preparations of meat or fish   15.2    All sectors average  5.1 
19  Preparations of cereals, flour, or milk  14.3  65  Headgear and parts thereof  5.0 
07  Edible vegetables  13.7  13  Gums, resins  4.9 
08  Edible fruit and nuts, peel of fruits  13.6  82  Cutlery, spoons, and forks  4.7 
01  Live animals  12.6  41  Raw hides and skins  4.6 
60  Knitted or crocheted fabrics  12.2  76  Aluminum and articles thereof  4.3 
58  Special woven fabrics, tufted fabrics  11.7  68  Articles of plaster, cement, asbestos  4.3 
64  Footwear, gaiters, and the like  11.7  38  Miscellaneous chemical products  4.1 
23  Residues from the food industries  10.3  92  Musical instruments.   4.1 
61  Apparel and clothing knitted  10.2  91  Clocks and watches and parts thereof  3.9 
54  Man-made filaments  10.0  48  Paper and paperboard  3.6 
62  Apparel and clothing accessories  9.9  89  Ships, boats, and floating structures  3.4 
55  Man-made staple fibers  9.5  72  Iron and steel  3.4 
63  Other made-up textile articles   9.5  94  Furniture, bedding, mattresses    3.4 
87  Vehicles other than railway   9.1  86  Railway or tramway locomotives  3.4 
18  Cocoa and cocoa preparations  9.0  78  Lead and articles thereof  3.4 
52  Cotton  8.8  25  Salt, sulphur, earths and stone   3.2 
50  Silk  8.2  79  Zinc and articles thereof  3.2 
51  Wool, fine or coarse animal hair  7.9  28  Organic or inorganic compounds  3.1 
57  Carpets   7.9  81  Other base metals, cermets   3.1 
69  Ceramic products  7.7  29  Organic chemicals  3.1 
35  Albuminoidal substances, glues  7.6  46  Manufactures of straw of esparto  3.0 
59  Impregnated or coated textile  7.5  74  Copper and articles thereof  2.9 
42  Articles of leather, saddlery, luggage  7.3  85  Electrical machinery and equipment   2.8 
06  Live trees and plants, cut flowers  7.3  95  Toys, games, and sports requisites  2.8 
96  Miscellaneous manufactured articles  7.0  44  Wood and articles of wood  2.6 
36  Pyrotechnic products, matches  7.0  71  Natural or cultured pearls    2.5 
66  Umbrellas, walking sticks  6.7  84  Boilers, machinery, and mechanical  2.3 
37  Photographic goods  6.6  90  Optical measuring  2.3 
  column continues on next page    45  Cork and articles of cork  2.0  
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Table 8.  Continued 
HS2  Label  AVE  HS2  Label  AVE 
03  Fish and crustaceans, molluscs   6.6  27  Mineral fuels, mineral oils  2.0 
93  Ammunition   6.6  80  Tin and articles thereof  1.8 
56  Wadding felt and nonwovens   6.6  30  Pharmaceutical products  1.7 
09  Coffee, tea, maté, and spices  6.6  88  Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof  1.4 
33  Essential oils, perfumery, cosmetics  6.4  49  Printed books, newspapers, pictures  1.4 
39  Plastics and articles thereof  6.2  75  Nickel and articles thereof  1.3 
70  Glass and glassware  5.9  47  Pulp of wood  1.1 
34  Soap, organic washing preparations  5.9  26  Ores, slag, and ash  1.0 
67  Prepared feathers and down articles  5.9  97  Work of arts, antiques  0.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations; MAcMap-HS6v2; reference group weighted. 
Note: n.e.s. = not elsewhere specified. 
 
Table 9.  Average protection by sector and degree of transformation 
   HICs  MICs  LDCs 
Product  Primary  Semi  Final  Primary  Semi  Final  Primary  Semi  Final 
Fruits and vegetables  12.1  11.9  13.7  21.7  19.1  20.6  16.2  20.9  22.6 
Meats and live animals  12.8     35.1  11.9     29  8.8     21.2 
Dairy products  46     46.8  18.5     28.2  19.3     16.6 
Vegetable oils and fats  5.5     6  6.4     21.3  8.2     15.9 
Seeds, flour, and spices  31.6  36.7  15.1  17.6  16.8  19.5  7.8  14.5  17.1 
Sugar     77.1  10.7     26.2  22.5     15.1  22.5 
Tea, coffee, chocolate  1.2  1.9  13.8  20.2  14.2  24.2  17.3  19.5  21.1 
Tobacco  22     22.8  44.3     41.4  15.2     30.3 
Other agricultural products  4.8  3.9  17.4  6.7  9.1  9  6.4  11.4  8 
Fishery  4.9  5.9  7.2  16.2  16.6  14.1  22.9  24.3  17.7 
Paper and wood  0.3  1.2  1.1  2.9  8.7  12.1  7.9  12.6  15.1 
Apparel and textile  3.4  6.1  8  9.6  15  19.8  13.1  18.3  22.7 
Leather products  0.6  2.8  6.9  7.7  9.2  17.2  7.1  11  19.2 
Metal and mines  0.2  1.4  2.7  2.5  7.3  12  6.2  11.1  15 
Mineral products  0.4  0.7  3.1  6.3  8.2  14.3  12.4  8.5  18 
Chemicals     2.8  1.9     7.9  10     8.8  11 
Transports        5        16.3        12.1 
Electric machinery     1.3  1.4     9  6.2     15.2  11 
Other industrial products        1.7        8.5        12.9 
Oil  0.7     2.4  3.8     8.4  16.7     11.7 
Source: Laborde (2008); MAcMap-HS6v2; reference group weighting scheme.  
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It is interesting to look at the issue of tariff progressivity
33 in more detail since on average tariffs 
applied to final goods are twice those applied to intermediate and raw products. Tariff escalation, allowed 
by tariff progressivity, is in fact a central issue in negotiations. Table 9 presents the average tariff by 
sector and degree of transformation, using the broad economic categories (BEC) classification. One can 
see that tariff progressivity is a widespread phenomenon, affecting almost all the sectors and the three 
country categories considered. A few exceptions are seeds and flour as well as sugar in HICs, tobacco and 
fishing products in MICs, and oil and dairy products in LDCs. Two points deserve attention. First, in the 
case of sugar in HICs, results are biased because of the European Union tax on the share of final goods 
that contain sugar (additional duty). Second, for semi-processed goods, the rule is more the exception, 




In the previous section, we looked at tariff dispersion inside each country’s tariff schedule; we can now 
investigate tariff dispersion at the product level across the world—in other words, which products face the 
most heterogeneous trade policies? This issue is relevant for exporting countries that specialize in such 
commodities: they may face narrow market opportunities and are exposed to asymmetric demand shocks. 
Table 10 shows the 10 products that have the highest coefficient of variation of the power of the 
tariff in rich countries, middle- and low-income countries, and LDCs. We also indicate the 10 HS2 
chapters for which the simple average across products of the coefficient of variation is the highest.
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As expected, agricultural products dominate this ranking. Tobacco and alcohols have a very high 
level of dispersion across developing and least-developed countries: some have already adopted a 
domestic taxation policy for these products (high excise tax and low tariffs), whereas others still collect 
important amounts of duties on them. On the other hand, developed countries apply a similar level of 
tariffs on these products. For this latter group, the tariff dispersion depends strongly on their comparative 
advantages in each commodity. In particular, we see a different level of protection for some specific 
inputs or intermediate goods that may be imported freely in some countries but are taxed heavily in others 
(e.g., live animals for breeding, meals of meat products). 
  
                                                       
33 Because dealing with tariff escalation requires one to compute the effective rate of protection, we limit our analysis to the 
tariff progressivity concept. Tariff progressivity means that tariffs increase with the level of transformation. Therefore, it is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for tariff escalation. 
34 The same good (sugar) can be consumption good for final consumers and an intermediate consumption for firms. 
35 We compute a simple average of the coefficient of variation computed at the HS6 level and not the coefficient of variation 
at the chapter level because we want to focus on the variance across countries and not the variation across products within a 
chapter.  
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Table 10.  Products facing the most heterogeneous protection 
HS6 products  Coef. 
var. 
HS2 chapters  Coef. 
var.
a 
Across rich countries’ markets 
060210  Unrooted cuttings and slips  145  10  Cereals  73 
060491 
Foliage branches and othr parts of 
plants  143  02  Meat and edible meat offal  66 
230110  Flours, meals, and pellets of meat   143  06  Live trees and other plants  66 
010391  Live purebred swine weighing inf 50 kg    132  01  Live animals  64 
110820  Inulin  129  11  Products of the milling industry  62 
060120  Bulbs, tubers, tuberous roots, corms   122  04  Dairy produce, bird eggs, honey  58 
020622  Frozen edible bovine livers  119  07  Edible vegetables  49 
010599  Live domestic ducks, geese, turkeys   116  23 
Residues from the food 
industries  40 
120740  Sesamum seeds, whether or not broken  115  12  Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits  33 
100890 
Cereals excl. wheat and meslin, rye, 
barley  115  16  Preparations of meat or fish  33 
Across middle- and low-income countries’ markets 
220290  Nonalcoholic beverages excl. water  108  22  Beverages, spirits, and vinegar  61 
220710  Undenatured ethyl alcohol  92  24 
Tobacco and manufactured 
substitutes  58 
240391  Tobacco: homogenized or reconstituted  91  02  Meat and edible meat offal  27 
240130  Tobacco refuse  91  06  Live trees and other plants  24 
220430  Grape must partly fermented   80  04  Dairy produce, bird eggs, honey  22 
330210  Mixtures of odoriferous substances   75  67 
Prepared feathers and down 
articles  22 
220429 
Wine of fresh grapes incl. fortified 
wines  74  93  Ammunition.  21 
220720  Denatured ethyl alcohol and othr spirit  72  43  Fur skins and artificial fur  20 
220590  Vermouth and othr wine of fresh grapes   69  01  Live animals  19 
060410  Mosses and lichens for bouquets   69  07  Edible vegetables  19 
Across LDCs’ markets 
240391  Tobacco: homogenized or reconstituted  113  24 
Tobacco and manufactured 
substitutes  70 
240130  Tobacco refuse  104  22  Beverages, spirits, and vinegar  33 
220710  Undenatured ethyl   99  93  Ammunition.  21 
240399  Chewing tobacco, snuff  97  44  Wood and articles of wood  18 
220290  Nonalcoholic beverages   96  90  Optical measuring  15 
240290 
Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos, and 
cigarettes  94  81  Other base metals, cermets  13 
240110  Tobacco: not stemmed or stripped  69  86  Railway or tramway locomotives  13 
240120 
Tobacco: partly or wholly stemmed or 
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Table 10.  Continued 
220890  Ethyl alcohol  54  09  Coffee, tea, maté, and spices  13 
440399 
Wood in the rough whether or not 
stripped  46  87  Vehicles other than railway  13 
Across all markets 
220290  Nonalcoholic beverages  103  24 
Tobacco and manufactured 
substitutes  61 
240391  Tobacco: homogenized or reconstituted  96  22  Beverages, spirits, and vinegar  56 
220710  Undenatured ethyl alcohol  95  10  Cereals  40 
240130  Tobacco refuse  92  02  Meat and edible meat offal  37 
060491 
Foliage branches and othr parts of 
plants  78  06  Live trees and other plants  37 
100610  Rice in the husk: paddy or rough  76  04  Dairy produce, bird eggs, honey  37 
100640  Broken rice  75  11  Products of the milling industry  32 
220430  Grape must partly fermented  73  01  Live animals  31 
100630  Semimilled or wholly milled rice  69  07  Edible vegetables  25 
220429 
Wine of fresh grapes incl. fortified 
wines  69  23 
Residues from the food 
industries  23 
Source: Authors’ calculations; MAcMap-HS6v2; unweighted computation based on the exhaustive data set. 
Note: The coef. var. is the coefficient of variation of the power of the tariff.  
a Figures at the HS2 level are a simple average of the HS6 coefficient of variation. 
    
35 
4.  UNDERSTANDING CHANGES BETWEEN 2001 AND 2004 
Using both MAcMap-HS6v1 (base year 2001) and MAcMap-HS6v2 (base year 2004), we can study the 
evolution of tariff protection between the two time periods. This comparison is particularly valuable since 
both data sets have been developed with the same methodology. Moreover, we propose an original 
method to decompose the changes observed at the aggregated level into different components (changes in 
the weighting scheme, the unit values, the exchange rates, the effective applied trade policies at the six-
digit level). 
Overview 
Overall average protection has decreased by 0.5 percentage point, from 5.6 percent in 2001 to 5.1 percent 
in 2004 (see Table 11). This reduction is mainly due to MICs. Indeed, while developed countries had to 
achieve their Uruguay Round commitments in 2001, the MICs’ schedule ended in 2004. Moreover, some 
MICs have unilaterally liberalized their economy—for example, India in 2004 for its industrial products, 
and China, in all sectors, to complete its WTO accession. Besides, several south-south preferential 
agreements (implementation of customs unions and free-trade areas) were translated into tariff reductions 
among member states or with third countries, whenever a common external tariff has been adopted. The 
share of world trade, in the framework of such agreements, is still growing: +26 percent in 2001 and +32 
percent in 2004 (or from 16 to 20 percent, when excluding intra-EU), coming either from an increase of 
trade inside existing agreements or from a creation of new ones.  
Table 11. Changes in applied protection between 2001 and 2004, group of countries 
Sector  World  HICs  MICs  LDCs 
Initial  Point  Relative  Initial  Point  Relative  Initial  Point  Relative  Initial  Point  Relative 
Agriculture  19.2  -0.3  -2%  17.1  +1  +6%  24.1  -3.3  -14%  16.5  -2  -12% 
Industry  5.0  -0.6  -12%  2.6  -0.1  -5%  11.5  -2.6  -22%  12.1  -0.4  -3% 
Extraction  1.6  +0.3  +18%  0.7  +0.2  +25%  5.8  -0.2  -3%  12.9  -0.2  -2% 
All  5.6  -0.5  -9%  3.4  -0.1  -2%  12.3  -2.6  -21%  12.8  -0.7  -5% 
Source: Authors’ calculations; MAcMap-HS6v2 and v1; reference group weighting scheme. 
Note: Adding the initial value and the difference in points gives the 2004 tariff level. A few differences prevail with Table 5 
figures since for the purpose of comparison, we have considered only the countries included in both databases. 
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Figure 8.  Average protection in 2001 and 2004, selected countries 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; MAcMap-HS6v2; reference group weighting scheme. 
The increase in average agricultural protection in rich countries (+6 percent in relative terms) 
contrasts with the decrease in protection globally. This does not seem to come from a modification of 
trade policies, but rather is the result of two effects. First is the mechanical effect of the fall of the U.S. 
dollar on the European Union AVE, due to the conversion into U.S. dollars of the specific tariff (initially 
expressed in local currency per physical unit). Second, several tariff rate quotas previously unfilled (in 
quota) have been filled or even exceeded. The immediate consequence is thus an increase in the 
protection exporters face. 
Focus on a Few Cases 
Comparing average rates of protection across time can be misleading since several distinct effects 
interact. Following Laborde (2008), we identify the following effects: 
1.  The real change in trade policy, that is, evolution in the value of tariffs (ad valorem and/or 
specific) 
2.  The shift in TRQ regime (see supra) due to a change in the filling rate of a TRQ 
3.  The evolution in a trade pattern that will affect a related weighting scheme 
4.  The evolution of unit values that will modify the AVE of specific tariffs 
5.  A change in the exchange rates used to convert specific tariffs from the local currency unit to 
dollars 
6.  Other factors such as the effects of an improvement in the quality of data collection and data 
processing on trade policies 
For researchers, real changes in trade policies are mainly related to effect 1 and to some extent to 
effect 2. However, other aspects deserve attention. The evolution in AVE, even with a fixed specific rate, 
may come as the consequence of the evolution of import prices in U.S. dollars (effect 4). In addition, for 
specific tariffs initially expressed in currencies other than U.S. dollars, the dynamic of the exchange rate 




Using the reference group weighting scheme, we limit, but do not suppress, the modification in 
the weights matrix. Using import weights, more volatile and endogenously related to changes in tariffs, 
increases the problem. In particular, this introduces a strong downward movement in the aggregated 
protection. In fact, when a subset of tariff lines are liberalized, tariff rates go down and trade increases on 
those lines, overweighting them compared with the previous system of weights. 
 Thus, the evolution of the AVE might be the combination of effects 4 and 5 (i.e., the evolution 
of unit value in local currency). 
The difference between the aggregated protection in 2004 and 2001 for each country is given by 
 with   being the weight in year 200x applied to the AVE 
tariff in the same year 200x ( ) for product i and exporter r, where  .  
Let’s also define   as   with   the ad 
valorem component of the tariff,   the specific component expressed in the local currency of 
country s by ton,   the ERGUV in U.S. dollars per ton, and   the exchange rate of local 
currency to U.S. dollars. 
Then, we can rewrite the difference as follows, noting that the 
FR0x exponent indicates the year 




This equation decomposes total change as follows: 
1.  The E1 effect, related to the change in tariffs, which we derive by comparing 2001 and 2004 
tariffs and using 2004 values for all other variables 
2.  The E2 TRQ effect, computed using 2001 tariffs to which we apply 2001 or 2004 TRQ filling 
rates. If no TRQ regime shift takes place, this component is equal to 0. 
3.  The E3 weighting scheme effect, computed by using 2001 tariffs (with 2004 exchange rate 
and unit values), looking at the difference in weights between 2001 and 2004. 
4.  The E4 unit value effect, computed at 2001 weights and tariffs when we look at the difference 
in AVE coming from the change in unit values, after controlling for the change in the 
exchange rate. 
5.  The E5 exchange rate effect, computed by using 2001 values for all variables and introducing 
the change in exchange rate. 
This decomposition method is not path independent: however, we use an intuitive sequence. We 
start from 2001 tariffs, and we deal with non–trade policy parameters (exchange rate E5, unit value E4, 
trade E3). The changes in TRQ filling rate (E2) is at the margin between the evolution of trade and trade 
policy. After controlling for all external changes, we finally look at the shift in tariffs (E1). 
                       
 
                                                       
36 When AVEs are computed using a world unit value, the evolution of one currency is not correlated to the changes in 
world prices for a subset of goods. When using importer-specific unit values, imperfect pass-through explains the divergence 
between world prices and import unit values. 





Figure 9 shows the evolution of the aggregated tariff by sector, distinguishing between the 
reference group and the trade-weighted methodologies. The choice of a weighting system is not neutral. It 
seems that the trade-weighted system influences the aggregated protection downward.This is particularly 
true when tariffs decrease.  
Indeed, when a subset of tariff lines is liberalized, tariff rates go down and trade increases on 
those lines, overweighting them into the total weight system, compared with the reference group 
methodology. 
At the sectoral level, the agricultural sector experiences the biggest changes, mainly imputable to 
an increase of the unit values (in U.S. dollars). We also observe that exchange rates exert a strong effect 
in the opposite direction. Finally, we check the important role of TRQs in the sector. When a country 
opens (or enlarges) a TRQ, the corresponding protection normally decreases while trade flows increase. 
Consequently, the level of protection will fall when aggregating protection data using bilateral imports.   
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With regard to the manufacturing sector, changes are rather similar with the two methodologies. 
The observed variations are mostly explained by pure policy changes (e.g., unilateral reform in Egypt and 
India). 
Figure 9.  Decomposition of protection changes between 2001 and 2004 by sector 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; MAcMap-HS6v2. 
In fact, the decomposition shows that no matter which aggregation scheme we use, the policy 
effect is the strongest. Trade policy reforms are thus the component that most affects the decrease of the 
applied protection. Table 12 displays selected countries that experienced important variations in their 
applied tariffs. It also gives us an interesting illustration of mechanisms taken into account in the 
decomposition methodology. Changes are provided for all goods and for the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. The difference is given in percentage points (2004–2001) as well as in relative 
variation (with 2001 as the starting year). The evolution of the aggregate protection rate hides strong 
sectoral and country differences.  
China, Egypt, and India experienced the greatest variations (the average rate decreased by more 
than 40 percent). A large part of the decrease comes from unilateral reforms (e.g., Egypt and India in 
industry) as well as the completion of the last multilateral round (the Uruguay Round) in agriculture (e.g., 
India). Another important factor is accession to the WTO, which in the case of China means a significant 
decrease of its trade barriers in the agricultural sector (−14 percentage points). Finally, in the case of 
Egypt’s agricultural protection, a large improvement in the quality of the data (see Table 1) partially 
explains the increase of the protection measure. 
For Niger, a country that adopted no reforms during the considered period (the common external 
tariff was already effective when the West African Monetary Union was achieved in 2001), the variation 
in the applied tariff (−3.1 percent or −0.31 percentage point) is explained only by indirect effects, in 
particular by changes in weighting scheme (−0.36). However, in most of the remaining cases, changes 
linked to the system of weights represent less than a quarter (the maximal value is observed for the 
European Union) of the absolute value of the total changes.  
Considering changes at the sectoral level, we can see that unit values as well as exchange rates 
play a central role in the evolution of agricultural sector protection, due to the existence of specific tariffs. 
Changes in unit values (a rise in agricultural prices from their low level in 2001) reduce the protection by 
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0.5 percentage point for the United States, 3.9 for Japan, and 2.7 for the European Union (with an initial 
level of 5.1, 35.6, and 18.9 percent, respectively). The variation in the exchange rate (U.S. dollar 
depreciation) has modified the value of the AVE, especially for the European Union whose average rate 
in agriculture increases by 5.4 points. This implies that the rise of world prices in U.S. dollars has been 
less important than the depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the euro. Specific duties concern mainly 
agriculture, except for Egypt, where these effects are negligible because the country had to face monetary 
phenomena coupled with a simultaneous duty reform. 
For the United States, new bilateral agreements led to a lowering of industrial protection, as well 
as the reintegration of India into its GSP program. However, the largest changes occurred in agriculture. 
With monetary phenomena remaining neutral, we can see that the cause of the very high augmentation 
(+78 percent) in MAcMap-HS6v2 is the enhancement of the TRQ filling rate and a better description of 
U.S. protection with the use of national data instead of ITC data.  
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Table 12.  Decomposition of changes in protection between 2001 and 2004 













TRQ (E2)  Policy (E1) 
All products 
Australia  RG  -1.32  -25.7%  0.53  -0.23  -0.05  0.02  -1.6 
   TR  -1.67  -31.4%  0.59  -0.22  -0.08  0.01  -1.97 
China  RG  -6.21  -44.0%  0.00  0  -0.2  0.04  -6.05 
   TR  -6.27  -49.5%  0.00  0  0.2  0.09  -6.57 
Egypt  RG  -13.86  -56.1%  -2.23  -0.88  -1.69  0  -9.06 
   TR  -20.24  -68.3%  -3.02  -1.18  -6.89  0  -9.14 
EU25  RG  -0.08  -2.5%  0.30  -0.15  -0.15  -0.01  -0.06 
   TR  0.25  11.0%  0.17  -0.08  0.16  0.04  -0.04 
India  RG  -14.37  -42.9%  0.00  -0.01  -2.12  0  -12.25 
   TR  -13.49  -45.8%  0.00  -0.02  -1.35  0  -12.12 
Japan  RG  -0.64  -16.3%  0.23  -0.3  0  -0.32  -0.25 
   TR  -0.92  -19.2%  0.28  -0.32  -0.16  -0.3  -0.42 
Korea  RG  -1.32  -14.4%  0  0  0.11  0.08  -1.51 
   TR  -3.84  -38.6%  0  0  -0.03  0.06  -3.87 
Niger  RG  -0.31  -3.1%  0  0  -0.36  0  0.04 
   TR  -0.27  -2.6%  0  0  -0.31  0  0.04 
Switzerland  RG  0.3  7.1%  0  -0.91  -0.05  -0.08  1.34 
   TR  -4.63  -64.8%  0  -5.03  -0.35  -0.05  0.8 
USA  RG  0.12  5.1%  0  -0.03  -0.04  0.14  0.05 
   TR  0.03  1.9%  0  -0.01  0.03  0.05  -0.05 
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Table 12.  Continued 
Country  Weighting 
scheme 








TRQ (E2)  Policy (E1) 
Non-agricultural Products 
Australia  RG  -1.04  -18.8%  0.43  -0.16  0.04  0  -1.35 
   TR  -1.51  -27.0%  0.47  -0.11  -0.06  0  -1.81 
China  RG  -5.92  -41.2%  0  0  -0.09  0  -5.83 
   TR  -5.56  -44.7%  0  0  0.25  0  -5.81 
Egypt  RG  -19.33  -68.9%  -2.70  -1.08  -1.79  0  -13.76 
   TR  -30.33  -77.7%  -3.81  -1.66  -10.73  0  -14.13 
EU25  RG  -0.2  -7.3%  0  0  -0.09  0  -0.11 
   TR  -0.08  -4.0%  0  0  -0.01  0  -0.07 
India  RG  -15.76  -51.5%  0  0  -1.13  0  -14.63 
   TR  -14.22  -52.2%  0  0  0.62  0  -14.85 
Japan  RG  -0.15  -10.1%  0.01  -0.01  -0.07  0  -0.08 
   TR  -0.24  -13.4%  0  0  -0.17  0  -0.07 
Korea  RG  -0.12  -2.0%  0  0  0.05  0  -0.17 
   TR  0.12  2.7%  0  0  0.28  0  -0.17 
Niger  RG  0.24  2.5%  0  0  0.16  0  0.08 
   TR  0.24  2.2%  0  0  0.16  0  0.08 
Switzerland  RG  -0.51  -35.3%  0  -0.68  -0.04  0  0.21 
   TR  -6.02  -97.3%  0  -5.86  -0.2  0  0.05 
USA  RG  -0.17  -7.1%  0  0  -0.03  0  -0.14 
   TR  -0.1  -5.8%  0  0  0.03  0  -0.13 
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Table 12.  Continued 












TRQ (E2)  Policy (E1) 
Agricultural Products 
Australia  RG  -0.92  -33.4%  0.54  0.02  0.04  0.33  -1.85 
   TR  -1.06  -36.9%  0.38  0.09  0.23  0.14  -1.9 
China  RG  -14.03  -55.8%  0.00  0  1.14  0.5  -15.68 
   TR  -34.01  -80.4%  0.00  0  -2.42  1.98  -33.56 
Egypt  RG  26.04  168.9%  -0.47  -0.01  -0.34  0  26.86 
   TR  6.03  65.2%  -1.45  -0.15  0.59  0  7.04 
EU25  RG  2.44  12.9%  5.36  -2.7  -0.21  -0.2  0.2 
   TR  2.21  16.2%  3.85  -1.77  -0.64  0.6  0.17 
India  RG  -0.77  -1.3%  0  -0.06  -0.27  0  -0.43 
   TR  2.81  5.1%  0  -0.2  3.77  0  -0.76 
Japan  RG  -7.37  -20.7%  2.99  -3.86  0.42  -4.31  -2.61 
   TR  -6.17  -17.2%  2.77  -3.17  1.54  -3.26  -4.04 
Korea  RG  -17.36  -32.0%  0  0  0.62  1.14  -19.12 
   TR  -67.06  -65.3%  0  0  2.16  1.09  -70.3 
Niger  RG  -1.54  -11.7%  0  0  -1.41  0  -0.14 
   TR  -1.04  -10.1%  0  0  -0.96  0  -0.08 
Switzerland  RG  10.14  23.1%  0  -4.93  -0.42  -1.15  16.64 
   TR  8.5  27.0%  0  -3.27  -0.17  -0.84  12.79 
USA  RG  3.73  72.8%  0  -0.47  0.11  1.99  2.1 
   TR  2.28  90.3%  0  -0.16  0.28  1.2  0.96 
Source: Authors’ calculations; MAcMap-HS6v2.  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
MAcMap-HS6v2 is an important tool for researchers aiming at monitoring border protection at the most 
detailed level. The exhaustive geographical coverage (171 importers and 209 exporters) and the important 
sectoral disaggregation (5,113 products, of the HS nomenclature) allow for extensive analysis. The data 
set contains a large set of information. It provides consolidated tariffs, ad valorem applied tariffs, the ad 
valorem equivalent of specific tariffs, tariff rate quotas, prohibitions and antidumping duties, as well as 
preferential rates for the year 2004. While relying mainly on ITC’s raw data, the 2004 database also takes 
advantage of other sources (TARIC, USITC, and national sources as in the case of India and Egypt, for 
instance), which largely complete and enhance the quality of the data.  
The methodology applied is similar to that used in the previous version of the database 
(MAcMAp-HS6v1 for the year 2001); however, some key improvements have been made. A new 
algorithm is used to deal with the harmonization of product nomenclatures as well as to handle code 
oddities. The method applied to process tariff rate quota information has been deeply improved. Finally, 
we have fine-tuned the way of aggregating tariffs.  
Indeed, many applications that use protection data require aggregated protection data. That task is 
still a challenge for applied economists; none of the existing solutions is perfect. The way tariffs are 
aggregated can result in substantial differences in findings. The reference group methodology we propose 
aims at reducing the endogeneity problem between tariff and trade, while preserving the specificities of 
the trade structures. 
In addition to thoroughly describing the methodology, the paper demonstrates how such a 
database can be employed. First, it can be used to describe the level of applied protection across the world 
in 2004. Of course, the relatively low average rate, 5.1 for the entire world, hides a high level of 
heterogeneity across countries and sectors. Even if the strong dispersion of tariff rates can be adequately 
observed only when remaining at a detailed level, some interesting patterns also appear at the aggregated 
level.  
First, the average protection decreases with the level of development: in 2004, HICs have an 
average duty of 3.3 percent, against 9.6 percent for MICs and 12.2 percent for LDCs. Overall, even if 
poorer countries are more protectionist, they usually adopt simpler policies than the complex and 
heterogeneous tariff schedules of HICs.  
Second, the agriculture sector is more protected (18.9 percent) than either manufacturing (4.4 
percent) or extractive and energy products (1.9 percent), reflecting both the consequences of the exclusion 
of agriculture from the previous cycles of GATT as well as the particular political role of agriculture for 
all the countries considered. Last but not least, final goods are taxed more than intermediate goods, a 
practice that aims to increase the effective protection of the locally produced value-added.  
The joint use of both databases, MAcMap-HS6v1 and MAcMap-HS6v2, can shed light on how 
and why protection evolved between 2001 and 2004. In particular, the fact that we are using a similar 
methodology enables us to distinguish different causes that might explain the variations observed: 
changes in exchange rates, in unit values, in weighting schemes, or in the effective applied trade policies.  
That protection worldwide decreased by 0.5 percentage point can be attributed to MICs. Indeed, 
whereas developed countries had to achieve their Uruguay Round commitments in 2001, the MICs’ 
schedule ended in 2004. Moreover, some MICs have unilaterally liberalized their economy (e.g., India), 
and, finally, China completed its WTO accession.   
The elevation of the average agricultural protection in rich countries (+6 percent in relative terms) 
contrasts with the global decrease. It does not seem to come from a modification of trade policies; rather 
it is the result of two effects. On the one hand, the mechanical effect of the fall of the U.S. dollar on the 
European Union AVE, due to the conversion into U.S. dollars of the specific tariff (initially expressed in 
local currency per physical unit). On the other hand, several tariff rate quotas previously unfilled (in 
quota) have been filled or even exceeded. The immediate consequence is thus an increase in protection 
faced by exporters.  
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To conclude, it is worthwhile to note that one can use the MAcMap-HS6 database for purposes 
other than to describe trade policies. Indeed, numerous studies have already used the different versions of 
MAcMap-HS6. Researchers have used it as an input in CGE models to assess the impact of multilateral 
or bilateral agreements and as data in econometric studies.   
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APPENDIX 1:  UNIT VALUE CHOICE AND TARIFF-CUTTING FORMULA 
Notations 
Variable  Definition  Dimension 
CTS_ADV  Bound rate—ad valorem component  hs6, reporter 
CTS_SPE  Bound rate—specific component  hs6, reporter 
MFN_ADV  MFN applied rate—ad valorem component  hs6, reporter 
MFN_SPE  MFN applied rate—specific component  hs6, reporter 
UT_ADV  Preferential rate—ad valorem component  hs6, reporter, partner 
UT_SPE  Preferential rate—specific component  hs6, reporter, partner 
uvm  World unit value (median, trade weighted, three-year average)  hs6 
uv  Exporter reference group unit values  hs6, partner’s 
RefGroup 
uvr  Importer unit values (median, trade weighted, three-year average)  hs6, reporter 
uve  Exporter unit values (median, trade weighted, three-year average)  hs6, partner 
uvb  Bilateral unit values (median, trade weighted, three-year average)  hs6, reporter, partner 
XXX_uv*  Ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of tariff XXX (= CTS/MFN/UT)  hs6, reporter,* 
  using unit value uv* (= uvm/uv/uvr/...)   
For modeling reasons, descriptive works, or to apply nonlinear tariff-cutting formulas, we need to 
compute the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of a mixed or compound tariff. The major difficulty is 
choosing the right unit value to convert the specific component of the tariff. Taking too large of a uv will 
lead to overestimating the protection, and vice versa. Two principles should be kept in mind when dealing 
with unit values and AVEs. 
First, unit values are noisy. Different methods can be used to solve this problem. Looking at 
bilateral unit values, even after taking a three-year average, a high volatility still appears. If it is legitimate 
to expect unit values to evolve with the partner, the quality of the traded good, the “pricing to market” 
behavior, it seems unrealistic to accept a coefficient of variation of 10,000 percent for a homogeneous 
product like sugar. Since unit values are the ratio of the value of trade divided by the traded quantity and 
that quantity is badly registered, the unit values reflect the noise coming from low-quality data on 
quantity. So, we have a trade-off between keeping the maximum of information (i.e., bilateral unit value) 
and the needed robustness of unit value and AVE. To check the last objective, we have to discard some 
information or compute unit value on a larger set of values. The current solution used in MAcMap-HS6 is 
the exporter reference group unit values (ERGUVs). Unit values are computed by group of exporters 
(trade-weighted median). The ERGUVs are more robust than bilateral unit values or exporter-specific unit 
values but keep some specificities of the exporter based on its reference group (richest countries; very 
open, middle-income countries; less open, middle-income countries; very open, low-income countries; 
less open, low-income countries). Moreover, a filter is applied to bind the unit values into a range 
between 1/3 and 3 times the world (median) unit value. 
Second, the relevance of unit value concepts depends on the issue under study:  
•  Looking at effective protection faced, unit values related to the exporter’s specificities are 
required. Indeed, a specific tariff has more protectionist effects toward a low-price producer. 
So, a specific tariff’s AVE should be dependent on the exporter. A choice among uvb, uve, or 
uv could be made.  
•  In a multilateral negotiations framework, we need to have a single AVE per MFN tariff. So, 
the choice of uvr or uvm seems relevant. It is noteworthy to see that WTO’s principles to 
select uvr and not uvm will favor protectionist countries more since the unit value could be 
endogenous and positively correlated to the tariffs (quality effects, rents behavior).  
Describing the current MAcMap methodology, we focus on uv for relevant applied AVE and on 
uvm for multilateral talks. To implement the WTO scenario, it is better to use uv_wto to stick with the  
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existing WTO guidelines (uv_wto is a function of uvr and uvm but also of the gap on AVE resulting from 
the use of both unit value systems).  
Applying Tariff-Cutting Formula 
If applying a tariff-cutting formula to an ad valorem tariff is straightforward, things become more 
complex when specific components are involved.  
General Principle 
A tariff-cutting nonlinear formula f(.) will transform the base rate (the current bound rate if the product is 
bounded) into a new bound rate (nbr) that will cap the MFN rate (final_MFN). Moreover, no applied rate 
should be larger than this new MFN rate.  
Related to the binding power of the commitment, we assume that none of the AVE applied tariffs 
computed with WTO’s official unit values, whatever the structure, can be above the official WTO AVE. 
Following our notation, it implies that UT_uvm ≤ CTS_uvm for every WTO trade relation. However, we 
could still have UT_uv > CTS_uvm. Indeed, it seems that the unit values used for the official AVE 
computation are the most objective figures to determine whether a country respects its commitments or 
not.  
 
We assume that the structure of a tariff will not be changed by the liberalization process. If the 
tariff cut leads to a reduction of the MFN applied tariff, its structure (the size of the ad valorem 
component relative to the specific one) will be the same, meaning that each component is reduced 
proportionally by the same coefficient as the AVE: 
 
The constant MFN structure assumption is simplistic and neutral. However, it may be possible for 
some countries to reduce the ad valorem component more than the specific one, keeping the total AVE 
value equal to the new commitment. Indeed, specific tariffs have in reality more protectionist effects than 
ad valorem ones.  
Preferential tariffs are sometimes correlated with the MFN tariffs. We should take this into 
consideration (preferential rates expressed as a percentage of the MFN, or just equal to the specific 
components or the ad valorem one) when applying a tariff-cutting formula. However, since the basic 
distribution of MAcMap-HS6 does not contain this kind of information, we assume that a cut in MFN 
applied tariff will not have systematic effect on preferential applied rates. The preferential AVE will be 
capped by the MFN AVE using the partner-specific unit value—that is, Final_UT_uv ≤ MFN_UT_uv. 
Indeed, in the other case, the exporter should prefer to ask for the MFN rate than the preferential one.  
Finally, we avoid the case where the new WTO commitments will drive a change to the national 
tariff schedule, switching specific tariffs to mixed ones. For example,  
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The Pure Ad Valorem Case 




The final applied rate could be computed directly: Min(UT_uvm, f(CTS_uvm)).  
The Pure Specific Case 
In this case, the value of the uv is important for computing the AVE of the bound tariff. The 
determination of the final applied tariff is not affected by the fact of using different unit values since the 
reduction rate of the bound tariff is applied to its specific, and single, component. This specific value will 




The Compound Case 
In this case, a structure effect appears given the fact that the weight of AVE of the specific component is 
not the same in the MFN_uvm and the MFN_uv tariffs.   
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A Numerical Illustration 
Starting from a bound tariff of 100 percent + $1/ton, a MFN applied tariff of 75 percent + $1/ton, and a 
preferential rate of 50 percent + $1/ton, the following table displays the different operations made to 
determine the final applied tariffs given the uvm, uv1, and uv2 unit values. In this case, we see that using a 
Swiss formula (i.e., α = 50 percent) will result in a cut of the bound tariff of 80 percent. The binding 
overhang reduces this cut to 77.14 percent for the AVE of the MFN tariff. Finally, the preferential rate 
will fall by 72.3 to 74.9 percent according to the uv used. Indeed, the share of the specific component in 
the AVE is not the same for the MFN and the preferential tariffs. Using a different uv might cause 
distortions due to the nonhomogeneous structure of the tariff. We can notice that even if for some uvs the 
preferential (bilateral) rate is above the bound AVE, it is not the case when using the official uvs. In this 
case, the importing country still respects its multilateral commitments.  
 
100%  $1.00  AVE  75%  $1.00  AVE  50%  $1.00  AVE 
uvm  $1.00  100%  100%  200%  75.0%  100.0%  175.0%  50.0%  100.0%  150.0% 
uv1  $1.50  75.0%  66.7%  141.7%  50.0%  66.7%  116.7% 
uv2  $0.50  75.0%  200.0%  275.0%  50.0%  200.0%  250.0% 
20%  $0.20  AVE  17.1%  $0.23  AVE  AVE 
uvm  $1.00  20%  20%  40%  17.1%  22.9%  40.0%  13.3%  26.7%  40.0% 
uv1  $1.50  17.1%  15.2%  32.4%  13.9%  18.5%  32.4% 
uv2  $0.50  17.1%  45.7%  62.9%  12.6%  50.3%  62.9% 
Tariff formula cut [A] 
New MFN capped by new bound tariff [B] 
Ratio of reduction between initial and final applied MFN rates (  uvm ) [C] 
Proportional reduction of every initial component [D] 
AVE of the component using the  uv  of the row 
Initial tariff 
Final tariff 
Base rate  Initial applied MFN rate  Initial bilateral applied rate 
Final bound rate  Final applied MFN rate  Final bilateral applied rate 
 
Additional Comments: Mixed tariffs 
The MAcMap-HS6 methodology is aimed at limiting problems coming from the AVE conversion of the 
specific tariff. To achieve this goal, the ad valorem component of a mixed tariff is always preferred and 
kept. For example, a tariff defined as “3€/ton or 14 percent, whichever is higher (or lower)” will be 
transformed as a simple 14 percent. Even if we lose part of the available information, this approach 
allows us to discard the problem of applying highly volatile unit values.  
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APPENDIX 2.  APPLIED PROTECTION IN 2004—DETAILS BY COUNTRY 
Country  Reference group  Trade weighted 
  All  NAMA  Agri  Energy  All  NAMA  Agri  Energy 
Albania  8.3  8.1  9.4  8.9  11.1  11.4  11.6  7.5 
Algeria  13.0  13.1  15.3  11.0  12.2  12.6  10.8  10.9 
Antigua and Barbuda  9.6  9.4  16.2  2.4  8.8  9.1  10.6  6.1 
Argentina  11.6  12.2  12.5  0.5  9.1  9.5  9.3  0.5 
Armenia  1.5  1.4  4.9  0.0  1.9  1.3  5.5  0.0 
Australia  3.8  4.5  1.8  0.0  3.7  4.1  1.8  0.0 
Azerbaijan  6.4  6.3  10.6  4.1  6.1  6.6  6.2  1.8 
Bahamas  29.6  29.8  26.5  29.9  18.8  14.9  22.6  30.6 
Bahrain  9.3  9.2  19.2  4.1  7.1  8.8  16.5  0.4 
Bangladesh  17.0  14.7  19.3  26.2  17.4  17.0  14.4  28.3 
Barbados  13.7  12.3  47.4  3.4  12.5  11.1  30.5  0.7 
Belarus  10.9  11.3  11.2  4.1  3.4  4.6  4.6  0.1 
Belize  8.2  7.7  24.3  1.1  8.4  9.1  23.0  0.4 
Benin  9.7  9.9  11.6  5.5  12.3  13.2  13.3  4.3 
Bermuda  42.6  24.3  38.5  174.7  110.8  29.9  68.3  267.0 
Bhutan  15.3  14.5  21.7  10.2  15.0  13.7  29.6  11.5 
Bolivia  8.9  8.6  9.8  9.7  5.6  5.6  6.2  2.8 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  3.6  3.9  4.1  1.6  3.6  3.6  4.9  1.5 
Botswana  7.1  6.4  17.5  0.9  7.7  7.7  8.1  2.4 
Brazil  11.1  12.7  11.3  0.5  8.9  10.7  10.9  0.2 
Brunei Darussalam  9.3  8.5  24.4  0.9  9.1  7.4  28.5  0.5 
Bulgaria  6.8  5.6  19.8  5.7  8.0  7.8  21.3  1.5 
Burkina Faso  9.7  9.9  11.6  5.4  7.2  7.4  9.5  3.9 
Cambodia  14.1  15.0  13.0  10.5  15.1  14.5  16.4  21.0 
Cameroon  15.3  15.5  21.4  10.0  14.1  14.3  17.1  9.2 
Canada  3.4  2.8  15.9  0.6  1.5  1.0  10.6  0.1 
Central African Republic  15.2  15.5  21.4  9.9  15.1  14.1  19.0  7.3 
Chad  15.4  14.9  20.6  9.9  12.6  12.3  19.6  1.6 
Chile  2.7  2.5  3.7  4.1  2.0  2.0  1.7  1.9 
China  7.9  8.4  11.1  2.3  6.4  6.9  8.3  1.8 
Colombia  10.4  10.1  16.4  8.2  9.7  9.4  12.8  7.1 
Congo  15.4  14.9  20.6  9.9  17.3  16.7  21.0  9.1 
Costa Rica  5.2  4.1  16.4  3.3  4.0  3.4  7.6  6.9 
Croatia  4.0  2.3  16.7  3.2  1.2  0.6  6.3  0.6 
    
51 
Appendix 2.  Continued 
Country  Reference group  Trade weighted 
  All  NAMA  Agri  Energy  All  NAMA  Agri  Energy 
Cuba  8.7  9.6  9.7  1.6  8.4  10.0  9.9  0.9 
Côte d’Ivoire  8.2  8.8  11.4  3.4  9.2  11.0  10.2  1.3 
Dominica  7.2  7.0  16.1  2.5  8.5  8.5  11.7  0.5 
Dominican Republic  5.9  5.9  8.5  4.0  8.2  8.9  9.2  4.2 
Ecuador  8.8  8.6  13.3  7.3  9.0  9.8  10.8  2.3 
Egypt  10.8  8.7  41.5  3.7  9.4  8.7  15.3  3.5 
El Salvador  3.8  3.2  10.2  3.4  4.7  4.5  5.4  5.3 
Equatorial Guinea  14.0  14.1  18.8  9.9  12.9  12.3  23.3  7.3 
Eritrea  6.3  6.7  6.9  2.1  5.2  5.7  4.4  1.9 
Ethiopia  13.7  14.5  16.5  1.7  11.1  12.2  14.0  0.7 
European Union (25)  3.2  2.5  21.3  0.3  2.5  1.9  15.9  0.2 
FYMOR  8.3  7.7  14.8  8.0  7.1  5.8  14.2  5.3 
Gabon  14.0  14.1  18.8  9.9  14.5  13.9  19.1  9.0 
Georgia  8.6  8.1  11.4  10.3  7.0  7.4  8.1  3.2 
Ghana  14.3  11.0  18.9  26.7  12.6  11.1  17.7  14.2 
Grenada  9.8  9.3  17.3  5.7  8.4  8.6  9.8  1.4 
Guatemala  3.7  3.3  8.6  3.5  5.4  4.9  6.5  7.2 
Guinea Bissau  9.9  10.0  11.6  5.9  10.0  10.0  12.9  2.8 
Guyana  8.8  8.2  18.6  6.0  7.8  7.6  11.0  5.4 
Honduras  5.8  3.8  10.5  12.0  6.5  6.1  5.3  12.4 
Hong Kong  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Iceland  5.5  1.3  63.8  0.0  2.6  0.7  29.1  0.0 
India  19.1  14.8  58.4  13.3  16.0  13.0  58.1  13.5 
Indonesia  5.5  5.7  9.1  1.6  4.3  4.6  7.5  1.0 
Iran  17.6  18.5  26.5  5.2  16.0  16.6  17.1  5.1 
Israel  5.0  3.2  33.4  0.4  3.3  1.6  26.8  0.3 
Jamaica  4.6  4.3  13.9  0.6  7.0  7.3  12.9  0.1 
Japan  3.3  1.3  28.2  1.1  3.9  1.6  29.8  0.4 
Jordan  8.6  7.7  14.6  10.4  9.4  9.5  12.7  5.3 
Kazakstan  4.4  4.0  8.9  4.0  3.1  3.4  4.1  0.4 
Kenya  17.1  15.9  29.8  4.3  11.8  12.9  18.6  2.4 
Korea  7.9  5.9  36.8  4.2  6.1  4.6  35.7  4.0 
Kuwait  3.9  3.9  4.4  3.1  3.5  3.5  3.7  2.2 
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Appendix 2.  Continued 
Country  Reference group  Trade weighted 
  All  NAMA  Agri  Energy  All  NAMA  Agri  Energy 
Kyrgyzstan  5.6  5.9  6.8  2.4  5.5  7.0  3.4  0.5 
Lao People’s Democratic  8.4  8.1  14.3  6.2  10.9  10.2  19.0  8.2 
Lebanon  3.8  3.5  8.7  2.4  4.9  4.8  8.1  2.3 
Lesotho  5.4  4.8  15.7  1.1  13.9  15.0  4.3  2.4 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  21.5  19.8  14.2  37.6  18.6  21.8  11.3  2.1 
Madagascar  3.9  4.2  4.6  0.0  3.6  4.3  4.1  0.0 
Malawi  11.2  11.6  12.3  6.7  8.8  9.0  8.4  7.6 
Malaysia  14.2  13.5  26.9  3.8  5.7  5.1  17.9  2.2 
Maldives  23.4  23.8  17.6  24.6  21.1  21.8  16.6  23.3 
Mali  9.7  9.9  11.6  5.6  7.3  8.1  10.0  0.7 
Mauritania  8.5  8.6  8.9  7.8  8.2  8.1  7.8  11.7 
Mauritius  17.9  18.1  21.6  10.7  12.9  11.4  14.7  22.6 
Mayotte  8.5  9.9  6.6  0.1  3.6  8.0  7.1  0.0 
Mexico  8.3  6.6  22.6  8.5  3.1  3.1  3.9  1.9 
Moldova, Rep.of  2.6  1.9  10.8  0.1  2.2  1.8  6.1  0.0 
Morocco  19.0  16.9  40.8  18.4  18.3  17.3  38.4  8.7 
Mozambique  9.8  9.8  12.2  5.9  9.1  9.2  10.8  5.1 
Myanmar  3.9  3.9  6.0  1.9  3.8  3.4  8.6  1.7 
Namibia  5.2  4.8  15.6  1.0  6.2  5.7  11.1  0.7 
Nepal  13.5  13.7  14.2  11.7  15.9  17.1  10.6  16.0 
New Zealand  3.7  3.7  6.3  1.8  3.2  3.4  4.4  0.7 
Nicaragua  4.3  3.2  12.0  4.3  3.9  3.6  5.0  4.4 
Niger  9.7  9.9  11.6  5.4  10.1  11.0  9.3  5.6 
Nigeria  26.4  22.7  42.6  27.0  23.2  20.5  35.6  28.5 
Norway  5.4  0.2  74.4  0.0  2.1  0.2  32.9  0.0 
Oman  8.2  7.7  22.0  3.9  5.1  4.9  7.4  2.0 
Pakistan  16.0  16.2  22.7  10.7  15.8  16.1  20.1  12.1 
Panama  6.6  6.3  15.8  3.0  9.7  10.2  11.9  4.1 
Papua – New Guinea  3.5  2.1  19.0  0.0  3.0  2.9  6.8  0.0 
Paraguay  8.3  8.9  11.7  1.8  11.4  12.2  13.8  1.7 
Peru  9.3  8.7  12.5  11.3  8.8  8.4  9.5  10.4 
Philippines  5.0  4.7  9.8  3.1  3.2  2.7  9.1  2.8 
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Appendix 2.  Continued 
Country  Reference group  Trade weighted 
  All  NAMA  Agri  Energy  All  NAMA  Agri  Energy 
Qatar  4.1  4.0  6.7  3.1  3.6  3.6  4.3  1.9 
Romania  9.5  9.2  22.9  2.5  7.2  6.2  27.2  1.0 
Russian Federation  10.2  10.3  12.1  4.7  9.8  9.6  12.1  1.5 
Rwanda  6.8  6.4  10.5  6.1  6.4  7.0  7.3  0.6 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  9.8  9.9  14.1  2.6  11.2  9.8  22.4  1.0 
Saint Lucia  5.9  5.8  12.5  2.5  6.1  9.8  9.4  0.7 
Saint Vincent  7.5  7.3  12.3  5.2  9.2  9.6  8.4  4.0 
Saudi Arabia  6.3  6.2  7.7  5.3  6.2  5.8  8.2  4.8 
Senegal  8.4  8.9  11.7  3.7  8.4  9.7  9.7  3.5 
Serbia-Montenegro  6.5  6.0  15.4  4.0  8.6  8.1  18.7  3.1 
Seychelles  29.0  28.6  42.2  15.4  34.1  39.1  33.9  0.8 
Singapore  0.1  0.0  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0 
Solomon Islands  35.3  38.4  46.7  21.8  44.3  43.6  69.0  34.2 
South Africa  6.9  6.4  15.1  0.9  4.9  5.5  8.2  0.2 
Sri Lanka  7.3  6.3  19.7  5.1  6.7  5.2  18.4  5.0 
Sudan  19.1  19.4  24.4  7.5  16.8  17.0  17.7  5.0 
Suriname  10.1  9.8  19.2  5.5  10.0  9.8  17.2  2.8 
Swaziland  5.2  4.8  15.6  1.0  9.1  8.5  15.0  0.5 
Switzerland  4.6  0.9  54.0  0.1  2.5  0.2  39.9  0.0 
Syrian Arab 
Republic  15.8  17.0  16.5  7.7  16.4  17.0  15.2  9.3 
Taiwan  9.8  9.3  23.7  4.4  5.1  3.4  19.0  7.5 
Tajikistan  6.8  6.7  9.2  3.2  6.7  7.1  6.8  5.0 
Tanzania  11.2  11.1  17.5  1.5  9.0  9.3  14.6  1.5 
Thailand  13.6  12.7  38.8  0.8  9.3  10.1  20.4  0.2 
Togo  8.4  8.9  11.7  3.7  11.8  13.1  10.6  7.8 
Trinidad and Tobago  8.2  7.5  16.8  4.0  4.8  4.6  13.4  1.9 
Tunisia  19.7  18.9  46.3  7.4  17.7  16.8  36.7  5.7 
Turkey  4.9  2.5  35.3  0.2  1.9  1.4  13.3  0.1 
Turkmenistan  3.0  1.8  18.2  0.9  5.6  1.6  53.4  4.2 
USA  2.5  2.2  8.9  0.5  1.6  1.6  4.8  0.3 
Uganda  7.4  6.4  9.8  10.7  4.9  5.1  6.5  1.6 
Ukraine  6.9  5.9  26.3  1.2  7.1  7.2  32.0  0.3 
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Appendix 2.  Continued 
Country  Reference group  Trade weighted 
  All  NAMA  Agri  Energy  All  NAMA  Agri  Energy 
United Arab Emirates  4.1  3.7  9.9  3.2  3.9  3.5  9.1  2.7 
Uruguay  10.9  11.5  12.2  0.5  7.0  9.1  8.5  0.1 
Uzbekistan  9.7  11.2  7.4  4.1  4.5  4.9  2.4  1.3 
Vanuatu  15.9  14.1  45.6  8.2  19.0  11.2  62.5  27.6 
Venezuela  10.5  10.5  14.0  8.2  11.4  11.1  13.5  7.5 
Vietnam  11.7  10.6  19.8  11.3  13.3  11.6  25.2  17.1 
Yemen  11.8  12.3  10.2  10.5  11.1  12.5  8.6  7.3 
Zambia  10.2  9.0  13.3  14.9  7.9  7.8  8.0  8.8 
Zimbabwe  14.6  14.3  20.5  11.6  15.1  15.2  19.5  7.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations; MAcMap-HS6v2; reference group weighting scheme. 
Note: Agricultural products are defined using the WTO classification. NAMA covers non-agricultural products. Extraction and 
Energy products corresponds to chapters 25, 26 and 27 of the HS. 
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